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FOREWORD 
By The b m r y  of Safe 
This "]&%port on the International Control of Atomic Em&' ia in 
the main the work of a B d  of Codtsnta to the Deparhcmt of 
f3tatg. The Board carried out its &gunant under the g a u d  
direction of a Commitfee on Atomic Energy which I wt up on Jan- 
7, 1W with Dean Achwn, Under Secretary of State, es Chairman. 
A letter of transmittat at the beginning of the Report embodies the 
oommenta which Mr. Acheson's Commithe made on the unanimous 
hdhga  and mmmmmdations of the Board of Consultants. 
In thus t r d t t i a g  to me the detailed report of the Board, the 
Committee emphmbes the Board's obsemation h t  the %port i not 
intended aa a h a 1  plan but "a place to bgm, a foundation on wbioh 
to build". The Commitbe also ststee that it regards the consdtanta' 
work as "the mmt constructive a d p i e  of the question of in& 
natiod control we have men and a definitely hopeful approaoh to a 
soIution of the entire problem". 
The intensive work whioh this document d e c : t a  and the high 
qwlifiaations of the men who were conowned with it make it a paper 
of wwud importance and 8 suitable st* point for the informed 
public discussion which k one of the e a s e n u  fmhm in developing 
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"Antioipatiug fayorab1e s c h  by the ~ & h d  Natiom-bm 
on tbe p r o p d  for tbe e a b b h e n t  of r conmimion to W r n  
the problem ~te to the cuntrol of atomic m m  d . o t h w  
weapons of e b l e  mnss de&u:tion, the Sew* of St& bi 
eppointed a C o d W  of five membere to atudy the mbject of b a n -  
trols and aafegua& n e m d q  to proteat tbis Government ao that 
I W p m s  hemsftar e e l ~ t e d  b represent the U p i a  S b t a  on the 
I 
&nmbion m have the benebit of the study." 
I 
I At our h t  meeting on Jmu* 14, the Committee concluded that the 00mideratiDn of m b b  and deguardls would be iaaeparable h a plan of wbich they were a park and that the Commbion would 
I look to the Ammican repmwtative to put fornard a plan. At that 
I meeting we dm agreed that it w a  b t  wential to have a report' 
prepared mudpiing md appmbhg all the &vast fmta md formu- 
lating prop&. In order &at the work should be uaeful, it waa 
newsmy to ddgnah mea of recognized stbbmenta md varied 
b-und, who would b prepared to devote the major part of 
their time h the r rnStk+  
On January 23, 1940, we appointed fa a Board of comdtmts for 
thiepurpoee: . 
Mr. David E. Idhthal, Chairman of the Tenmwee Valley 
Authority, who acted m Chairman of t$e maedting B o d ,  
Mr. Chaster I. Barnard, President of the New Jawy Bdl Tde-. 
phone Compnny, 
Dr, J. Robert Oppenheimm, of the California Institute of T&: 
noIogy and the Univerrrity of California, 
Dr. Charles Allen Thomtte, Vim President and T + d  -. 
.tor, Monmmto C h m i d  Compmy, and 
Mr. Harry A. Winne, VimPreaident in C h g e  d . 
Policyy Q d  ElectriQ Cornmy* 
- .  
its entire w, siace 
of the p r o k ,  aad 
hrra now oompIetad ita toport, which ia tmimitted herewith. 
A preliminmy M t  of this report wen firat pmented to your Com- 
m i t h  ten days ago. hhmiive dimmaion betweea the Committee 
and the Board led to the d w e l m t  of further oonsiderationa 
embodied in a aubsequwt dreft. SW1 further d & c d n  d t e d  in 
the report now t r d t t g d ;  
We lay the report before y o l ~  'as bh@ baa submitted it to ua 
"not as n final plan, but as n place ta begin, a foundation on which tg 
build." Zn our opinion it furnishes the most constructive analysis 
of the qumtion of international control we  ha^'&& m d  s d&&lgl 
hopefd appro& to & eohtim df the entire prilblm. We d d  
it for your consideration ~ E I  representing the fthin8fpoItk ~ t k h  #i& t 
the beat prospech for both d t g r  md development of ato.ph 
for peaceful purpasea.may beToand 
-In p ~ ~ ,  .me 'are impreaeed by the great ~~~ of w 
intanakna1 ~ p c y  with ,emative powera apd ftmotiona w1upIoa 
.- Of&wp~odiOa wd ~uPBFvifrb~ hi coqtrast ka .any 
d h  d~ goWm . a t m p w  b COW d ~ t i O d  
-& o & d e  re&mhd &by s oo'nidtmm~ to "4utlad' tha 
me of' atomic en= for war. In our judgment the htter h y p e  of 
a r g h t i o n  offem little hope of achieving the securiky and s a f e  
we me seeking. - .  
We aro impraed alao by the mpwt of the plan which concen t rah  
in the hands of tho international wency only tho mtivitim which it ie 
&dial to control becawo' they 'me dangerous to international 
security, laving ns much freedom as possible to national and prihte 
research and othcr activity. 
We wish to s t r a  two ma ttm brought out in tho Board's report- 
mnttera of importmco m comidcring the  report'^ pr@ qs &ey 
affect h e  security of the United S t a b  both during tho period of tmy 
interarttiod h & n  of &hem and during tho p&d required to 
put the phn into fd effect. ' ' 
The ht mntbr concerns the W o s u r o  of inlormation not now 
g e n d y  known. The rcport poinb out thst the p h  nmdtates 
the M o s n r o  of inforrrmfion but p d t e  of tba &dosum of mch 
information by progrwivc stag=. In our opinion mrim st* may 
upon further study be suggested, It in cnough to  point out now that 
there could be at 1-t four g m d  points m this progrmsion. 
bfomtiop,  generd y d&bd as that requid for an nndmtandhg 
of the workability of pmpmab, would have to be made amdsbIe st 
the time of the dbwiom of the p r o p d i n  theunit* N a t b  A M 0  
E$iergg Oonimission, of the report of the Commhim m the Wmity 
C F' 
f '  
- 
closure mi& ehorten that period by as muoh as a year. Whethm 
any nstim--we sre excluding Bri- and Camda+uld 
aehieoe suoh an inbdva  program is a mat* of sezious doubt. If 
tiher pmgmm w e  spread over a comsid~~~b1.y 0- period, the 
dimluaure referred to would not shorten the sort appreciably. 
!Fhe d atage of disclmum might otxur when the pm@ in- 
mtbd orgmisak was actaany ~ ~ t a b -  by the d o n  of the 
various g~vmmmte upon the report of the United Natiom. At fi 
time fbe mgmhiion would require most of the mmhbg acienUo 
Hnowldge but would not require h d e d  technical lrnowAmr h 
the k n d d g e  d tbe m o t i o n  of the bomb. 
By the time the orgmhtion ppae d y  to mume its fmtiom in 
the field of induskid produ&op it would, of comae, reqnire the a- . 
nologid information md h w - h o w  o m  to csrrg out ite hak. ' : 
Tb infonuation r q g d h g  the co~~tnretion f the bomb w d d  not be . ' 
emntial to &e p h  until the k t  sstage d a r t  th0 orgmhtion 1R.as 
prepared to mume ~ ~ ~ t y  for mmch in the field of qlcmiva 
as an djmot  to ita orntional dutia. 
T h e ~ ~ ~ ~ a d m f a t f e p ~ ~ ~ ~ e a s s u r n p ~ m ~ ~ d a a ~  . 
o m  phpicd things. Hem h the plan p k t a  of progreea by 
continue the mandactm of bomba. The plm do= no 
b' * d-ib ebdkdtw-uiatbewb 
d a U & e i s c t s l d ~ e w o d d B i t u a ~  
Pow Committee, Mr, $em*, your f w t k  btnwthwm 
f o w h e t h ~ y o a b e l l w o i t h p e r f d t h e ~ y o a ~ b i t a n d  
m a y n o w b e ~ o x w h s f h e r y o u ~ ~ t o k o ~ ~ ~  
6dd under your guidsnce. 
Respccbfdy mbmaitbd, ' 
DEAN A C H ~ ~ N  
&*91 
V 4 2 ~ ~ 1 8 ~ b  Bum 
JAMM -B; C m m  + 
Lmm B. OElovm3, 
Majw Qlenaal, U S A  
Jom J. MCCLOT 
The Honorable 
d m  F. BXRNIEB, 
B e e  of-, 
I Wauhingtm, Dl 0. 
i,. 1 J< 
tN.,TRUDUCTtO.N ri;-. 
I .  
4; ,, '.- b *  * )  . I4? 
. m b a a  @l.&tanb met for ths fint (im* on Jam*=., 
amfearing brieQLy dth the b t w y  of B W I  
~ A h p $ p  , m. xap&bg .t& -botwd's d p q r n t  ,b study the pro- of- - 
bhmmtbd a t m i  of abmic en-. For more than mca:w,& 
* *t tima we damhd *atbuy our mt$e tSmrs a d  emet&@\h .;
the grob7i.ve we,+kd tg s4qdg llnd report upo~: We *W% 
the riaa install~tioh~ atO&Bi&e, Tehn-e, +d Lo. * 
New WXh, md B p m t  hys m m d i h g  *th luumtm3 **, 
k d ~ t i d  wta, md geologists, authbritiea in the t d m i d  fie& 
-ed && htomie h a  Febru- 26th this W C B b a s  
in& &no& oontin~fody, dev&pPhg~+nd Ppriting the fallowing d. .- 
Om w* iq thia * d+ no$; fd mwmJ mum the mu8dmw 
d the m m m d & i ~ n  w k h  & thg produet bf grn delibtimm 
Buk it Ldevqnt as a meaaure of bow important, end urgent w k h W  
it 6 be &st the Wmmont md the p ~ f r l ~  d  W J h d  Stis- 
dmhp rr asd wotkible plan, before the a h d y  hunched. 
intwmhbd, ahvmi~ emmW such mQpoBptum 'fh&t 
i6.wx.ukOf. be *p@,I 
ws kra a0nduded.m de1ibti9a en thismoat d i d t  4, 
&inanpi&ofhopekamsd d w p a h , h u t w i & s m ~ h f  
- ddmm It is a m  conpiotion mt . s s&id~hxry plsz3 loan M' 
--4 a a d & & w h l r f w e h m ~ m m d m ~ ~ ~ r m 4 b  
tim> of such a It ia worth qntmating.&e waw of. bpe~and 
, a o ~ d ~ ~ 1 a e w ~ & t J J , o f w ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ f ~ w ~ ~ ~  
s t  the outset. The v& diI3eu~tiei sf probbom were ~w&B!, 
aad mi d y  condudad 
VdOW d@'lMti~e pr0 
but make na ~ ~ e n d a t i o n s ,  But we s-wd ,&W~#VM *&heL 
ecspjgPed Eve m43n.d 
wh~.wtm far apmt at t;he a u W ~ ~ ~ ~ , e e l  @!the d d a -  
&*m 8-a ,in ia~p&h~+W & d & h d e t q r  -9mt 
~ 1 s ~ . d h ~ ~ ~ ~ t i o ~ m ~ ~ ~  
t --. 
- 
&ti04 to make' it d m  tbat wo did not begin with a preaxmived 
There is W f u r b  r- for dacri'b'mg thb prowm. 0th- 
wodd have a s h h r  cspixlca i€ @ey were abIe to through a 
period of h e  t r t u d y L b f ' b ~ ~ & ~ &  m abaorption in the 
Illaliont and d~~ faeta. Only then, phnps, may it be pdb1e 
*b+d& tbe wisdom of the judjguent we have' maoh& md possi- 
.b%tim of b M n g  upon it. 1 I , .  
The p h  of the report itself msy be briefly 8describd;-as am aid in 
reading it: L 1 
Section 1. we examiaed. the maons that h v e  led k l s  &LUG& 
moat for &e iabmatimrd mnhl of ab&c cmqg and, the +- 
pro& for d i h g  tb objective by a ~ t e r n  of iwpcctiop: ' 
h Seotian II. the etsential charackistica of a worbbIe p l k  for 
d k y  we #Wed, and the cowiderrtions that favq tbe develak 
moat d a p b  we time this dhmion is &udd, 
the O U ~  of 8 4@ W0 See it aFe &ppW&. 
h &$ion III. the asenti& ~f m orguhatik && iuti nu& 
principles into are dascnid. 
In &tion XV. we considea: t&e poblmm of the bamition period 
had& from the preaent to the full operation of the p h .  
~ e h a v e t & d t o d e v e ~ o ~ a m ~ t  thstwi~ b e w e f d , ' k c t e a f 4  
phn, but as a p h  to b&, a fw&h vn d k h  to ha. h h y  
~ ~ t i o ~ ~ t a t ~ s t a g e a ~ d m u s t b e & J w e h a v s n o t  
touched upon at dl. We recognk~ that & the agmmm4 d 
other nations to such a ph.wiH r r k  questions the precise eonbws 
of which cm M y  be dram m ~ ~ W L I ~ C B  of htarmtional rnc&np 
and negotiation. We have not, of murm, undmtdm b discass, 
much Ieas to try to aetde, problems of this character. The n d y  
mated Atomic Commkhn of the United Natiom, when ita 
ddibemtione be&, will with rnmy of th& in joint dba&a. 
hdeed, thia proma of joint hhwmtimal & c d a  b iWL.rm 
integd part of any program for iwf- and &. 
We dcsire here to exprass our wt indehtednm to the Secrew 
d tho Secretary of State's Committee on Atomio En-, Mr. Hm- 
bert S. Marks, Aasistant to the Under M a r g r  of Stab, and to the 
Secreky of tbie board, Mr. Carroll L Wilsw. They h v e  ~ o e -  
tributad in many ways to the work of the board Wbateva d u e  
our work may prove b have owea B gcat d d  to their warn, Id&- 
genm, and high quality d judgment. Ww mi& wpddy tb - 
~ Q r o v e a  d h i ~ ~ b s i n h ~ a t t n n ~ ~ d t b  
i n d ~ b h l  conhctam for fd ibt ing  our inspection of the instdbtiom 
at Oak Ridge and Los Ahma, and Captain Jowph Volpo, h., for hie 
bimn services. We are also indebhd to s number of other officm 
and member8 of the Manhattan Project for their mopemtion. 
Aa o reault af thb coopaation wo have had unlimitd a m  ta tho 
entire range of fac& d d v i t i r s  involved in our assignment, and 
thirshaebePmmosthelpfut 
It has not h n  posible f& wmity rellsons to set forth in this 
report d of the fade which we b ~ e  taken iato amount, but wo 
Meve that those which are set for& me a dicient baais for a mful 
appraisal of our mnclusions and r e w m m d k .  

b u m  h m d e  so wideqmd. 
The m n d  point recogabed in the Agreed Deckation la that there 
can be no adequate militmy defense against a- weapons* A - 
great mass of axpert btimony is involved in an n p p d t i o n  of the 
about what the mote,future of tecbicd dovelopmenta in the arts of 
3 
6rmnm1 of thib point, but it eppeirrs to be accepted without m e n M  - 
reservation, and subject o a  ;# : rur-. qqmpriate opPnmiladdnms, I 
war may bring. 
Tho third point, Imd again we quote from the A p e d  D&a+, 
yk is that theso are weapons "in the employment of which no &B - 
nation can in fact have a monopoly." Qf the threi3, €his ia perhap& a 
tho moclt controversial. 8hhg a r p k n t a  habe be& brought fornard 
that the maear of technical and scientific knowledge id q m i q ~ c e  -- 
needed for tho B U M ~  development df -mi~  weapo11~ ia so great I -. 
that tbo results attained in ths Ilnifad h t s %  amot be gmdld&d by -p- 
put forward that &8. d m  d 
fmmd in ether parte of the world. !Phew srgumenta hays been mat '-- 
with gnat and w i d q 4  dtepticimi. It ie mogizd that the basio 
acierice on which the rdeaae of atomic energy rests is wwntMly n 
- 
world-wide scionm, and that in fact the principd Wings  required - I' 
for the succws of this project ara w d  known to competent scientbb 
throughout the world. It is recognized that the induiltrg required - 
and the technolw deveIoped for tho realization of atomic weapons 
are the ssmo industry and ti10 same technology which p4y aa ezamtial I 
a part in man's almost u n i d d  striving to improve his a t d a d  of 1 
living and his control of mture. It is further recopbed thst ato& 
mcqg playa so vital a pa;rt in contributing to the q t w y  pow=, - 
to the pogsible economic welfareI and no doubt to. fie wuritg of a - 
nation, that the incontim to other mtioons $0 press th& own devdop 
menta is o~erwhdmhg. 
Thus Lha Aped  Dedmtion baas its policy on tbe mvoIutbnar~ 
i n m e  in the powers of qestmction which atomic weapons havo 
hjcctd into w d m ,  and on the fact k t  neithct m.untermemma 
nor tho maintenance of secrecy abouG our own dcvdopmenta offem 
any adquato proapect of defenso. 
There are perhap other consideretiom which have tontrlbuted 
to the popular uflderstanding of tha n d t y  for international ma- 
-1, nlthough thcy do not appear explicitly in tbe Agreed Dedmtion. 
The United States ia in a rather specid padtion in any futnre abmio 
politid institutions, aad the hietoridly estaWed 
E21 
mar be r e v d  jm 
of wbich would mtriiute imm-bly to tbe pmmntion d war: 
d to the s t m g t h m  of the United Nations Oqpmbatioo. On; 
the one had, it waned unlike that the Unitd Neb Organb- " 
t k m w r u l d ~ i t s ~ ~ ~ a f ~ ~ d v p ~ p m b ~ ' '  
prevmtion of war." 
mwt mk ourselves to what extent they would 
&&C w a r f ~ 8 ;  h what &Mlt they tend 
of a M c  weapone au be awe of war; to wba 
patterns of moperation which may form a 
wider applimtiqw We oweIve4~ me ~f~tidied 
thiarsp& ppvide the basis of a &isfactory 
m- [31  
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. . QAsq 4-8 P.mel& 9 al WVaQ owds @A@ ol wop, - 
7W 'rtP~~no,, 94 1mm Y lW % IIOIEflPM GW wn ol Jo !* mV pal- ,q MOT@? F~J @1e)=.dep ¶a~ 
P !pa- b 7w w4=?J sl- - - =?!la pi.Ofi ql9 .: ' 
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~+bt tihe hawwda .d ,*h &-d4m.t8 . _ 0 . 1  
It be.~mph&d 3 &b pakt U-WB dO no& 
%d for -w a ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ m e ; b  ~ykm 
~l#mmLd ~ 4 l h * ~  am*. In 
that h + & O  tb4&emdi&mutbm of WF* we have lma 
~ w i t h ~ ~ $ a t a s a s ~ w i ~ ~ i n ~ a r  
~ . ~ m i # t b b & ~ ~ m d  r h d m p M d & a t i f w o d d  be- 
p m & & i d d d ~ b i y ' t h e ~ o f d @ .  
~~d t& B€&h ,  lb#mYa ii'eonoemed w i t h o m  
t h e r a n m . t o . o m m d + P w t ~ ~ * d ~ ~ * ~  
* o n m & i w k d - ' ~ Q f & ~ B y  
d #imwMw tRgi mt be rm adeg@t& d e # w d  
-&h . I *  I . - i D t Q M l i h . ~ q & ! a k a  
-e r W 8 p Q m M h b ~  -,*,*r* 
-tel.~-M&*e Wm D ~ t , a i h  
W o i  tb pmbkmk*~ w8 m ~inWM a0 'W uni- qtH&#ld 
d experte: ik h J N  diwmbm. wd for tq 
as inmy of therir w* without whid we BbQulB doww bv, 
bmn very mwh elbm to umhtjrnd.tdmaifuati~f; ,' I ; . .  ; . -  
As:& r e d t  of wr work with tbie ~ t b ,  we, ma h~ That 
stage in tbe aotiviw, Jading from raw rmttmids ta w e a m  
ncda 80- sort of cmtml, a d  h t  Wa muet be..exwW an dl. d 
Zhe&ouclpahthstdyIeadhmmtohph;tEsstr)t nr). 
g h t  am aonM of 'an opemtbn be diiien& d b b  
to be an adequptemIe ssfegttsrd; that there ia mid far a v m  m v e  
m d ~ ~ q g t c r l i f i e d a n d v a r i d e e i f f h e j o b i s , t o b e d o n e  
at d; that the m~trobg agaaoy mwt iM beactimin- ssd 
dedqnuent, and wd iafmud on wbt is an WWIW .Ei* iwh; 
d &ha+, for deative opptrol, the contmlhg wgmiatiom m u 4 b e  
as wd and w ~ o r n ~ ~ e d o b t ~  &w o g m t i o w , ~  m &e 
qMmtora bh&m.- - :Ibis .w m , m !  tthe f£&iv0 
-rn MWB W.W e b i 0 1 1 . d . W  U O* 
necmamy p m o d i b  h . s  m m d  e&me,of i m p € d a , d  
r w e a l w ~ ~ h ~ ~ a q f i W D g ( ~ ~  
a ~ w h d g *  d r n ~ ~ .  
A ~ d a r n B X 1 t e l ~ r o s n ~ W a b u g a d . o l o b r i t h &  
tion is that it will  hviiably be &w to UI into acmmt -in 
the sci- and techlogy of fhe W. One m o t  look intdligcdy 
fur r faotary of w h e  phciple of d+n operation one hus never 
heard. One cannot dd& jllepect il the pu~poee gf the -tor 
, ie to comwal the k v &  by whkb he how ta evade inrrpectbn. 
In a field as new and ae rrabjwt to t W d  -tion and change as 
this, the controling agency must be st last as inventive and at least 
ae well informed as my agency w4i& may athmpt to e d  mw. 
Even more i m p o m  thm tho technkd d i & d k  of d k h g  
an adequate e p h m  of inspection, qpbt a bdqprrnd d n & o d  
rimdry in the field of a t o h  en-, or thmogH mi oxgmhtbn whose 
naajor or whom sole k t i v e  ia a u p p h a ,  rur, the mmy hmm 
factam wbich in such an ~ ~ m t  would- tend to dee- tbe 
wddenee and the coopemtion # tn ite m. The k t  
*Membe&ip of this T e c l d d  Committee on b p & l o n  and Contml e&b 
Habd by* M t b u  Makid induded L W. Aham, 3. F. Mar, L. b. 
~ a ~ . ~ 4 A . B . ~ P . ~ R . Q . ~ , a M , C l o L  
w* J .  wmamm* and M*nson Bendat, ChalrmM. 
- of thae app- wfien-we wk whether it wodd in fact be possible 
L 
t @ d t  tbe v w ,  largs and very big& qu&ed organbation of 
expapte and  tom needed for the work. The work its&, 
wbi& would be w, p b b g  and audit& and attempting to 
h v m  ddences of ,f fflri#, would not be attrmtive to the type 
of p d  &Gal for h job. The activity wodd offer the 
inapmt- r motive j m t b k w  b&quata ta their immense and 
dmuy tkk. 
The p-nw: of * lm:hmby, qt .!yOreignm" ne-9 having 
q d  ~ M e g e s  &d b&mitb Id@rhg h h a t e l y  md generally 
into indwtriul and opem@w mdd be atkaded by Berioue 
mdd frictiow. For adequate k t i o n  the nambm are large. 
Aa an example, it b been e s b t e d  that h r  s diiEgsiph p b t  o w  
ated under national awpi~~~1,  to der .- ml hope of guarding 
against divedon, 300 i ~ s p e c h  would be They would 
have fo o h k  not merely amounts aM maswing iqtmimfe but 
dm individuals pefs~ady,  Inquiries would n d  to bo. made of 
individuals without regard to d or g e n d  status. Moreom, 
it would be eqedtdfy impoftant to the& the l o d o n  a d  +ploy- 
ment of and many WnoIogkb,. probably inddbg 
Btudents. fndustihl mareta wo& be at least to some exbmt, open 
to "&njfY. Tbe offwt of this d d  with cuunth. It 
wodd probably be as obnoxiom to Amerhm ui to. any oth- 
Its oo&e d w t  upon &e mo~de md I@ty of the impeating 
organization would be a&w. 
Some of the organizational ficultiea involved in inbate inept+ 
tion "down the lineyy of one organization m o t h  are h w n  from 
a@mw that rn undoubtidly mild wqared with what we &odd 
mticiptq here. The following me illwhtive of the politid difb- 
culties of pmticrrl operation (quite apart from those to be 4~xpercted 
in adopting the international systan b begin with]. Adequate qw- 
v e i b m  by inepection as the sole or p r i m q  mewm of mtrol in-' 
volvea a perskht challenge of the good faith of the nations inspected. 
If thia were w h e d  to relations between the chmcdoriea and gen- 
eral militarg s M 8  the difficulty wbih sariom might not be insuper- 
able. But official questioning of the good faith of a -tion by con- 
mete action of ins~pectors among its c i t h u  iS andher matter and . 
would tand to produce intad aa well as & e n d  political pmblemrr. 
A somewhat h i l a r  problem ia involved whem a $w86nmemt (or ita 
officids or employees) interfem wi th  the ~ ~ & D D B  d inspectom or 
molests or threahm tbem p a m d y ,  or bribee or m thern, or i 8  
d q j & i p l g a w a y o f t b # ~ .  guchiddentecouldnotbe 
avoided. 
@ of dtid ~ ~ P Q ~ ~ M C B  for War, am W d y  a matter of emb'  
between nationa. . The forces gm* out of this &a- 
for mto RV- betwaerr natiom to - 
dore powerful thm t h o  which mb'the pr-t M d  wid 
m p ~ t  to such mwuma aa oa. The &W .that; individual stdW 
tk bound to &',to i n w r  thdr indwtrirrl bwaq and 6dd a 
-less for military $otcyii@ti'& nill inepif&blg ~ d d o O  &jlr 
sptan of deguqdti whi& p W t a  t h a e  fuhdapentd WWB of 
Pitdry to exist. ' In short, m f ' q i t a m b o d  oh o~&i&g tbe pp$y 
development of' abmiu m e  d dying 4 d y  'on imp* 
tion for e q f o r w t  wUld at'the oubt b a m &  by conditions 
whi& W O U Z < ~ ~ ~  the -tern: , '. 
There i~ huch teck@qd i n f o p a t h  wbich uidwEa our belid 
&at '&eit&' crvl be df@f.va & if it b s u p p l ~ t e d  bp otpa  
a'&psps4to d u c e  its mpe ddi&pble'E&i$rtio~; to:limit &d 
that nied to be ixlplpected, Eo their.bpectioa, and to prov'ida 
a pattern of orgatthation which on the one hand w3t Jw of ,&,tank$ b 
tbe controlling agemq, md on the o+er . .  d m h t i d d  
sourcm, of m ~ S c t  and ,th?.'mducmmta to wmion. Much of tlk, 
h i h i i d  infomtiiin ia .int&ovm with htk d o n s  bf &h rep&. 
Bfil tho fa& on wL& we %ye our rec.Annmondbti~ for r wofkable 
pZen of control are dku&&l; the d W d  comidmations whi& Id to 
the conclusion atated in this rwon will bppear mom cohm~'thaki 
in the for* e m .  
1 '. 

x ~ . n d t b . ~ a s g g d * ~ * t *  Tfuoakre&plsn 
6iqat b tbt'wia fend tu d d o p  the h e f i c i d  M i l i t i a  of 
a m  mwjg a d  momraga &e wwth of bdmemtal knowledge, 
&bhg the *onatrucGve and imaginative imp& of men rather than 
m d g  eonoeatmthg sn the defaive and negative. It should, in 
abort, be a plan that loob to the- promise of man's future wall-being. 
rtswellaa~bi5t?ecllrity. : ,  , - 
s. The plnn must be ablo to copi with new dugem that m ~ y  appeer 
in h f w # y ~ ~ ~ v e l o ~ e n t - o f ~ . d e t $ v e l ~  
htional sense therefore the plq myi hvo' 
capable of e x h i o n  or contrac'tfi&- ' ' 
- . f. Tho plan musf inrdvs b&q&app3~tipp.amd mi*, KJV* 
between nations &the h g @ w  m p r n ~ l ~ ~ ~  +v&pm@t 
- fact. wo 4m come to  thin^ mti'r;l, t+ h e n +  & QS 
t&king 89 we moved. tmd &I we $erein q g &  qe.sbt 
q ~ $  in this mtion, in tbe forrp ef %h~.~nsidsratims U t  ijre jcelevsilt 
to aa eE8ctivo pmgmm for ~ & y ,  and that have led m to de+ 
wbat we bdiove is wi &quite p h .  

ba;b ur an!&mie,pwts plant can08 from the work done by these 
&&B khen tho atntoture of a- nuchi is reutongcd, but ~IEO to 
cqdain one major ftrct of M v e  hporbr?e: Only in mwtiona of 
m y  light nuclei# nnd in mtiom of the very heaviest, has them ever . 
hen, to the best of our knowledge, my h r g ~ ~ J e  r e b e  of atomio 
m e .  me m n a  for thh cm be given in somewhat o v e ~ p ~  
fom. 
Aa to tirs light adi-The £orces which hold all nu* p&ca 
together are athkthe. When lighbnudei eombine b make heavier P 
o n q  rant! in pwticular whm the lightest pucleus of 131, that of hydro- 
gen, is c o m b i d  with another right nucleuq t h e  ot-ti~e t o m  
release energy, This wmbhmtion of ligh elernmts to fofm mmowhat 
heavier oncs m m  in the st& and of the Bun; m the ~ n n  dectively 
what happch is that hydrogen nuclei combhe to fom the mom atable 
nuclei of helium. Blinost all mums 'of the meq& tmd on earth 
mrne to us from the amlight w-hich this great atornib mcqg plant 
prpvida, But th'o conditions wvlich make this plant p d l e  are 
vqy apocial, 4 we do not h o w  how to auplimte them on &d; 
w e  intiy very w& never I b  ki do'sb. ag depend on mninhbing 
matt& deep in the &iteriai of 'tho sun tat' vcrg high tomperbtur~- 
many millions of degrea. Tho liucl~ar rmtions themeelves provide 
tho  energy n e m  to keop the matter hot; and it is h p t  from 
&anding and cooling by the enomom gravitational forcm of atit& 
tion which'hold the sun together and pmvido a mrt of conhiher in 
wbich tbis tempernture and pmasure c m  be mahtsinod. For the 
. 
formonable fbt& the maint~n&nce of such rmtiona on ear& will 
not be poaeibIa; in the immediate f u b  it is c a y  not possl'bIe, 
As lo the h & s t  n&le&AIthough nuclew reactions am be carried : 
out in the Iaboratoq for all nuclei, 4 although in somo w e s  a givm 
nuclcar r&ction may dense energy ev&n for nuclei of intermediate r . 
weight, the properhim which make the h p d ~  release of such 
merm possibIe me peculiar, to the vey light nudai and to the verg L 
heaviest. And the verg hbviat nuclei have a proparty W a d  by 
none of tho the other elemenh. Theee very heavy nuclei generate 
energy if they be mused to split into lightor ones; this unique pro- 
cess is cded  " hion." Perhaps s dozen nudear speck are known 
which can be made to undergo fiwion; udor more dmtic treatment 
no doubt the Lt will be extended. But to make atomic onergy taka 
more than the property of Won. The h i o n  pro- its& must ' 
main% itself or grow in inhnsity so that once it is started in a 4 
few nuclei a chain of reactions d ' b a  set u~ asd a large part 05 the 
materid wiII become potentidly rttctiug. The agenw which initiates 
thi~ p r o m  L the neutroa, In bior i  neutrons ltre emilted; and in 
c+ nuclei bombardment by n e u d  is enough to cause hion.  
I: * * c  d 
w t  hduCB. T ~ o ~ w D .  CUUlOt 8 ahain 
eifher iW or in oombtion with any other m t d  ~~ t h  - 
urminm. Ne~erthdem, it -pies an important &tion with - 
regard to afbfqwds. The reason fg this is the f0Uowing: W1hut * 
uranium, chain rwwtiom asB impossible, but w i t h  a fairly suhbtial 
amount of urasium to be& with and auitably large q u n t i h  of 
thorium s ohah reaotion can be established fo mmufacture m a W  
whbh ie an atomic q l d v e  and whicb t3811 ale0 be wed for the mdu- 
hnm# of other b t n  rewtiolls* 
Abmlute con-1 of &urn would therefom mean adequate d4 . 
guard regding mw mat&&. Yet, ainw my eubetantisl leakage 
of d u m  through fhe p t e m  of mfrolg would make pat3ible the - 
axphibtian of thdum to prcyluwi d m g m u ~  amounts of 6~tomio 
q h i v e ,  pvisioxla govedug thorium should be inmrpmted in 
the ~yatam to mmpmwte for pxisible rn- of error in the oontrol 
of durn. The & h c e  of d u r n  and thorium in some naturaI 
depita rnakss this techidly a t h c t i ~ e .  
v t e m  of control aan be oommencd now, b m d  upon h s a  mabdhb, 
and if tbe time ehould e m  mme when othm matdab &b@ 
,-> . = , , , b i  14- : 
,, . xn;.p - 
e 1 
rptritted : c o w  &aii&&e. &dh'ou@ ,b 
&i& idstive ntrundanee thro&ho& 'tbe mld, chd * 6jwbiEl' ia 
&ax that many m w i  beyend the how6 m p p b  -'be 
it r ipp-~y tho'* 66 &e auth.dritia ~ f i  b= 
ip 4 h  c o n ~ t n t i o y  only Unasr very spedal &Ibgio osndiq&: 
!&a would to mean tbdt , the uers *ch necd b be .mew: 
- 1' to which acck must bo had.. and' which would tdiltiitnatelv- ham tb 
T h ~ o a n . b a e ~ t 3 1 8 f i ~ ~ ~ g p a l i ~ i e ~  1. ofthedozhhant~sFthspwmtaihtkminthefieMofatixnh.  mtq@. Ad-. in Wltdga niwt bm t q e c t d  In a mmtaat ' I-. D w ~ W n k ' & a t a a p t e n r o f  & q u a & i a i m ~ i b h  b r m e ~ ~ ~ o a m p t e M y c e a n g b t h e m t 1 ~ ~ ~ 0 f ~ -  
~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ o r s v e n ~ t h f o ~ t h t  T esaaw~ah 
in tlm -tin. 
~ t h r ~ b o m b w w f i F s t g e e d t g a r e w a a a t R i d e e p r e a d ~ e f  
h' that ite dtwalopmmt m d d  a faw sktio m t a .  4 it 
b e a m ~ k w ' ~ & t e ~ h U w ~ p i d l y i d ~ ~ d ~ q u e 6 1  
I h a d ~ i g ~ ~ . t n t b s ~ y a r r , s n d h o w ~ t a r t h e r  ~ o ~ t a  the ftltura s h e d  to haqe ia atme, thPr &ghd Opinion wm rap--by mthr at h vmy lit* d ths p o d i l i h  trndwtstimof~fidasndbtit~=mm-*t no -t of tbe -0 Wmhd dtusth wwuld hve mu& valid- . Thh~en%aW-b&hinWp&ble=to  apendhg.' B i n , w h i o h - h t - - m i h o w n d t h e M d f & Q  r p r o v i d e a ~ ~ f o r p o l i ~ ~ o n , d i n m & s t a ~ e n ~ ~ o n e  &ttrr,Lbutd to a high official, that it would not be long Mom we ooaId' 
d t  sw ic  e r r w g y ~ ~ O O m r n o n ~ ~ ~ w & y .  
Ndthw W initid view of a *&ti@ body of hnowkdge nor tha law 
one of mwtably mpid pjlanpn nacum* ~~ thb pmmt 
itaation. As the pmd& d m p b  hss down, &em iaJ s grent.deaJ 
that m h o t  h n t  mdew rm&m+how mlidy, M y ,  rsad W i a  
d, inhrdittd -l on the 8oundnw &,the d-: 
tion. Npvdfy will of mum nppes~ m mienMu dimovaria, bW& i ' w l I I ~ f p r t $ e & p a r t n a t e e a n ~ t i o n d ~ t h ~ .  b bubaet;tiemdtofnsw;typssd~osl~~~mde~~ 
b m w  meEho8s of physriaal @omtion, and in turn reg* g m  ! of d m t i 6 a .  Thie future qmknw m y  have 80-+~@ 
~ m ~ I m b ~ f w b ~ ~ r r a a #  
T h e P . e i B ~ ~ a b n o v a l ~ W ~ i n  
hhhldd~~ratheyrrre-aowhcml. 
t h e i m ~ o f ~ ~ f ~ a r x l d d ~  
~ b i g U 0 * b e  drambln &em. . - ; :+ , f  a .  ': .\9,>:*:,2$! 
' &lid for the mmmbIs foreseeable future, we-b&eve the maant , 1 
knowledge in the field i f  atomio en- ia I;dequata. We kn'ow, for 4 
example, that uranium ompica a unique role in the production of 
.I 
hionable subsfanw and that without it atomio expldvea cannot be 7 
made. We h o w  that there h m i d a c e  whatevk that thb situtl- 
tion wiU soon change. W e  know that a mat acienL%s and indwhid 
1 
. u
effort ia necesemy in ofder to produ"~ sbmi.c bombs: 'W is not to I 
my &ah tbe do*, h m s r  mt,  cmmot be ~ a l ~  we . 
M e v o  that m06bBuFes ona be taken b *QB tbis dmgm. we Iuro* - 
that the rcleale of atomic en- doee demomtsafe the wsvwW&y - 
of maah energy, b u t w e n l e o b t h a t  thefarrtilisrampb.of thh 
physid pFincipktJLet h lanrtihilrrtion 0f.e kilogram of any k i d  of 
math is qvivdennt to dl khe,gr,w,m c o d  in bhe UpitedStab in 
a pcrid of three months-h a statement of s pomibiliw, the & 
timefwbichhwremote W k ~ ~ o f d ~ a ~ W o f  
#fqgw& it may asy bath& ' , I '  
w b ~ ,  too, th.t -2ZZEidd rhicb are ma imch 
wil l  be M e d  by f d m r  jnv~tigatkw. , W1tb rr htv.pm much 
more could be letrmed h u t  IL~QR& arplmivee. Within a relatively 
h p m  tbe te- of atomic mmw,pmda .*b wil l  M e  
h e r .  X t  ~esllss likely that before- longwe ahaUh.1~~ dimmed 
many wdul W p e u t i c  and bhnolq$cal fipphtiona for the mib - 
active subetnncm which tan be made in the prodaction of h i m a b l e  
materials. Nor cm there ba much q&n that waya wili be f o d  
to cheapon d simplify the p-m involvd in #he production of 
the Wonable materids ~ d v e a .  
But what n& nwt to b~ e m w e d  is that th d p u d o  q d i @  
which haa BO =cited popular in-t mwt be seem in ita pmpw per- 
apoctiye in rdation to the g e n d  fig of whntib bodedge. The 
pmphecies ar, to future dhuvehm mu& not be pekmitted to obmm 
&a fact that them am at k q  plaoee b + u t  the field of b w h d g e  
h d o r  poiate -and which it should be M b l e  to mmhct aa 
&e&~e. d adequate wtm of control. 
Xn this report it ia p&bh for rts to do lit& more than record om 
own m e  of the rroudnw of this etabemet. Thaw who mud' - 
awume responsibility for politid action &add tast for t h d v e m  the 
comectnetsa of our ~nclu5iOns. 'nil3 bting wi l l  require Im ennlimk 
tion of difhult and m p h t e d  t e ch id  faeta, but we are cuddent . 
that the prooaaa is one which other lapen with tbe appropriate U p  
d sxparb3 clsn d y  repeat. W e  am dm co*t tht anlw the 
& l D F t i s m a d e i t ~ b e h ~ b l e t o o o m e t o ~ p a d & ~ p H ~  
ofdwhbg p U c d  mmwa bo'pre~eat abmb wadam d t o  
promote the beneficent use of atomic erqig. 
CHAPTER Ill 
&nsimetive &pl~ediwu hr Afomk Energy 
Ta "d+' atomit tw in dl of ib farms and enforce ma& a 
prohibition by an azmy of hqmtow rrnsming the aarth would overc 
whelm the apaciEgr and the endum~ce- of men, snd provide no security. 
Thi~ mdusion haa a further hp lbt ion  in a march for e d b y  
While suppression is not powible where we we dealing 
with the quest for howledge, thia thht to know (that cannot be 
" p o ~ y y  out of existam) m be used, dhmtively, in the d e w  
and building of an dective sgratem of s a f e g m d ~ .  
Hnmm history &om that my effort b confine the inquiring 
human mind, to wek to bar the spirit of inquiyy, ia doom4 to failure. 
From mch && cornea subvmion hnght  with terrible mneequences: 
Qesbpo, inquisitiom, warn, The developlraent of rrtomia en- ia 
one of a long, long line of dbtmvderr thut have their d 8pringa h 
the fiqp of man ta h o w  mom about t h e ~ ~ e l v e s  and their world. 
Like the jin jnkm w r d w  w h h  %ill d t e  iam&@ his opponmt 
disable himself with hig own thTClstB, -the dmignem of s e g s W  of 
mfegusrde for security ahodd and can utilize for eniommment muasurea 
that driving force to& howledge h t  irr part of man's T- 
nature. 
If atomia energy had only one conceivable na+ita horrible powm 
of maee daatruotion-*en the incentive to follow the mum of mm- 
pl& phibition and supp&on might be varg put.  Indeed, it 
has been mqwnaibly mggmted that howevm s t b t i v e  may be the 
pot8nWtiw for b e d t  h m  atomic en-, they sre so poweddy 
o u l i w ~ e d  by tbe mlevoIemt that our mme should be to bury the 
flthoJe idea, to buxy it deep, to forget it,' snd to make it illegal for 
anyone to cmy on fmthm inqairiea or developments ia thia 3dd 
We have mnduded &at the beneficial mbiliti-me of 
we more than p s i b i l i t i ~ ~ ,  for they are withh doere reach of wtd- 
its-in &he uae of etomie en- ahodd be and can be. made to aid in 
the devdopmma of 8 reamnably sum~iafd p t 8 m  of fad*, and 
the h w e ~ i s h p a r t ~ ~ t e d o n ~ t i d i d e a .  I < 
&at mankind can d d m t l y  look forward to sucb bmatdldd plpJ 
is a fact that offem a dmi of not inmnaiderabh hporhma to #k&hd 
of ~ a m m g w w & t h 8 t w n b e m a d e e f l w t i m  
r u -  1 . .  
dmai*t-b** &no@- 
; one uf d t i n g ,  detdng,  m d  sup- 
C a fob laicksn my -0 @ti=. It 
imgimbn. ~b f h  op- hi are 
. If wt7draw the hind of man, I& us my, 
who ww a&&& to pmhib*od ~ t r k x l a  inyeurn pmt. Compare W 
mofpere~~d-With Wewhowddkgxpactedta~a~m 
under WE& 'it b ddw *4 the ~mtrudtiie 'p&'e$a of atomic 
s ~ w y a l s o b e d e v e h g d .  . d b m i a ~ k ~ a ~ e w  
d.-t i .ve field in W h a l  men naey aske *-se pe-b; wM- 
8- ,4h&r pda&r role. *F ere in "on the grauad.&mr"- Mn 
g m h g  eolbwptise. Q w w a  .omMtieel: future d e ~ e I o ~ .  
@UCI the chmeb15~tiae, letwseipr9f h W o f - a i p  - h t  
huw msde it posaibIe Eor .the @RML- to .~-t. a li&. g r d a  #d 
youthful persomd 
The importanm of Wshfd( $W-8&-& k. bm&&l I& 
e a w d a e ~ o ~ v e ~ , h t ~ l B f & a a ~ a o f ~ i D . a  
d t y  0-tim of depnd npon the ~~~~ 
to t h a b  oqquhbion* If 6 9  d* 0da l io3 -  bss n o t d y - a +  
hrmmellb but 1Jso ~ & & h s ,  -* thb d h h . s j  
M c i d  pmibilitiw beoomes a -t weigh* am, I ,,. I 
WhaO are the b m d W - ~ L t i e a ?  We have had #e h e f i b  d ir 
enoughtful, m p u w  *. w . s p  
pcmtintbidlfkeld* ~ . ~ t ~ ~ h r f h e ~ ~ ~ e f  
Wdra In* CJP@$W ~ ~ B t o m i o  Ebqw by a p a d  of saierr,*h 
w h o ~ k e d w i t h n ~ ~ g e ~ ~ o f ~ ~ ~ i n t h  
fidd.* The oonduions there ete td reprwent sn appdad 05 & e ~  
WbiliW, tbat b, in ew@hh, d d q b g  srsd st &ha mlh 
bhd n d  m&Wind. . 1-r :Is .I . ;I, --, . r l  
Ia Wroduhg ita mnaMuma t#emport.tskm Wt''.We rata 
probably no 8- taaslaawaith d-he hi& ddwdo~eglt 
am w m  rEmd8$8, c o a h m m  $0 -m*nd what ' m d d  
m e  of the b v w g  ~f dam-mgmkb ihdlMAi0n.a' It +.%#.;a 
fur&= senao af pmectimak m#hahing tbcr0 "Thm unique ;m 
occbp&ion of the w . y w s  h the uw of atQmio mqg hr d h r y  
apphatiomJ' We W~e.ht tbie ia qtwdiy h%at+pcmmt. 
~ o p ~ t  of @mi? en--or, a mtdd m m c ~  mf powed?.md 
"tho application d.mdiatiaIl8 ~ ~ . ~ * ~ g p r o w t h d  #i 4 

. .. -8 
R&md 4 0 x 1  t the dan$er th& our n a t d  prewmpah Mth the 
A. I 
~tsPlotiVenspct~of ~tamicewawmay Windwtuibwmful+. 
Upbn inwtigation, some of the lat- msy prove ill-. - 
But if the W of pmt acbti f io md ~~ progrerple mp#ur 
~ , w e . I m h o w t b r t ~ d ~ o p ~ ~ ~ d n u t a  
ridhe. We Wave that only a system of d h g u d s  wM& in built 
a: . 
ammi these hopeful pmpmta can s u d  We have &ul Utmq&- 
out.this report ta make the ~ b b w 8 8 ~ ~ ' o ~  of 
~ I m d ~ ~ u d i k  - 
-, t . t e r q i w P P l ; , i . , t 4 e d  nr At pt in 
* m a  tbsww u t . o j i % + - ~ r ~ *  9- 
i p i p h d ~ t d ~ ~ ~ + ~ d ~ e n o . ~ o f ~ ~ a  
~ W b m i S f O F ~ ~ o f w ~ .  ~ ~ t o f h p n a t t Q P i s M t  
~ ~ i n ~ i n c h 8 p t e r V O f ~ g a c t i 0 1 1 .  . . 
1 I 
r i ~ d a y - L t ~ ~ ~ d t b o r i p m u b d o i ~ t * ~  
impo* ta.nlrth# seaking ta m t a w  f o ~ t h d v m  8 p o w d  
~ t @ ~ ~ e ; 6 ~ o f n ~ o ~ .  T h e f n o b ' t h a t r h h ~ o f  
nu*, qscur in a reQ- few plaaw in tIlA,wdd, aa uom- 
for mfi with dil, meab a competitive uituakion which 
might d y  ,produ$.a. i n b h W 9  temim in hbrmW &tima. 
We-believe that so lome as IIB&KW. or tbeL mbjaot. e~gsee in mps 
t i b i n ~ f i e l d e ~ f . a ~ o ~ & e M o f a ~ o d m ~  
. very gmat i n W  Wa d &a k a l  AmemMj d khe QniM 
, 
Natiom, in matting up an Atarmio Commki~~,  -hsd ddm d k  
furbing fat mu& in mind 
What is me h -cat to the fmm n a t i d  mmpeti~on 
f o r a n r n i a m i a ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ o f t b e d e v % l o p -  
cltlded, ~ d d  afE0G
m a & m a m h b h ~ ~ d - .  B.Wioltsllarry~iathil3. 
- dmgmus w- d ollly w*rrl.& fsitb +lid b l ~ ~ o 4 d  p* 
i n g ~ t d i n t h e ~ a y , i h & ~ ~ Q # f ] b ~ ~ t r t a L B  
see d moh pika to ,pmdll~~ hionable material mitable f a  bomb- - 
d tend to m-te a d  enmuage mrmptitiow wasbm. Thh * 
dmgm in the m t w @ q ~  b+ &kibutsble to the fwt &at thie pobn* 
lmmwhm rrQtiviQ L - w  an by nations or th& oifiP;ems. 
1 t b s s ~ a l a a r t o u ~ t b a f i f . t h s ~ o f  ridrybetwcm n 
i m ~ ~ l l ~ ~ r e m w d b y ~ t o f t b e - i n ~ ~  
~dthedavdoprnentofstomioenergg 40 miutenathd o r g d  I 
sation mpawiile h s31 p p h ,  a pmpwt would be & o d d  1 for~sptemof&. F o r i t i s t h e & m m ~ o b r i ~ d , t b A  , ' 1  :*,I hnmbili* of.&- ths d t & g  -petition thm& ,- dona that make bpction ~11workaW as a: d e  masxle of m&mL - g With &st-of i n ~ ~ r i ~ ~ & d , t h e p n , h l ~ ~  :- 
both h p d  ma e. :*:= - - .  8 F .  , . A', .'* Ct, 
2- 



It i3 taua that a e *  jtlbM@Wwm*+& dstrbidy F 
dmgmtu to ~ ~ w d ~ e % 0 ~ ~ ~ & ~ & ~ ~  aad 
Ir 
d w  bring into mors nmagdd~  fom l&e pr&lWt~~$hfdat 
dthest ippredondatomicreapo~a:  It'iTm8-,in- , 
r n & a 8 o h ~ d d ~ , t o m t h g n h W t i d ~ . ~ b M  J: 
m r m @ y w f o a l l a r r p e c t e o f a ~ ~ , d w ~ ' d ~ ~  r 
w h  u, great ma co-bly to mdm the pmspsotd4@&& $nm -! 
' & i m d h ~ ~ l  itssu w d  realbation. 80th an ovsrrll @rdt-of - 1 e m W e  rigat to dedop, optmb, a d  utilize, codam$ Qpon sn . 
' htmmtbd agmey, would d u q p  many of &a jnduam b d  em- 
nomio -tiom of tbie oolmtsg, for emmple, and would - - 
- - 
quib d i n r u l ~ ~ .  - 
Such a oomgrXeta iatwnatbllaz monopoly wouId be h d  to live Imder. 
f t e ~ ~ h ~ ~ & ~ e , d ~ t i n t i m e ~ ~ ~ m d &  ' .  
l o e e o f s u ~ t o & a d & ~ t h a t h y b e b i a d t h e p @ +  ' 
itw& Many of the coneidmtiona of mmpldv, irritation, tke 
mgmde&q of ampicion, the emmtmganent'of d d t  that we fomd '. ' 
mititukd sgainst a q y s h  of degtwda b y d  upon national o p e  
4 i m d h ~ ~ t i o n w a p l d t o e l e ~ l e e r d e g m a b e ~ ~  
by such an slldut prop04 for m - a t h  
~ p r o ~ m n n & a o t h .  ' F o r t h e F e a m ~ t ~ i n t h e  
field of stomio whtm there % no n& for an inkmatiad .- 
mg~opoly~ snd d m ~  -work may d should be open not e x c l m  . + 
ta the i n k m m W  agdmtion, but to prlvab and to mtiohl 
institukbminecpui&frmall~nnwr. T h e m f ~ ~ m ~ o n g t h o p w ~ p f  - .
- the p t e c r t  immdkte for bhe bem&id qloitation of 
en-. They are ~~y oomplex 4 o l d y  relahd to .h m . 
- 
~ ~ . s u B D . ~ % o  Th& open 4, in eome mpects, 04pnpd- 
GW h &bl~ h muoh of the fidd &odd go 8 low 
. towgxla ixleruring c q n M  betwersn the expPrrta of the iat&&bd - - 
. &ganization and tho88 outeide 'it, in indnstq and in dmkih a'laib 
edu&d qaniidom. The same fact should hedp mm&8h e. - 
tmbmb h t  might o&& develop towmi bumtmsti6 
- 
-- . - I  
4 
i a g 9 n d ~ ~ i o n , m d a i d i n p m ~ h d ~ ~  ' 3  
~ ~ a n d ~ d ~ ~ p m ~ ~ i a l r t o m i ~ ~ * " ' . .  ' 1'  
L f  . 
.* . . . . i ~ f o r ~ a ~ m i p m ~ p o n a m ~ d ~ ~ e w n t h o ~ a o m e ~  i 
71 . ,. , i d  be d o v a  the provision ,of the ,ikio&ble+maW; and we 
. , 
; r e g a d  the opmtion of -tarn or sepmtion p l m b  which m& the 
, m a U  for b& or which, by mhtiv* minor opeastid b m  
-.. - 
- mdd make the ma- for bombs, msdangemua wm:tbu& theyin 
. - hrmwottld have to be au'pplemsnted by auppEia of raw and 
. ' . 
by iaatdstio~ for wstmbiiag ahmic mpons. 
- ,  -We need not xegard sa daagmui either munb of ma- WE& 
- .  - -  sm +dl in relation toI&088 d e d  to make a weapon or  tion on 
, - ,  whom rete of pmduchim k d in thgge A furthw pomt 
which wi l l  prove im-t .ha atlrbWhg,S dt&a for the d e w  
, 
or danger d an opemtilm is- W. U 286 , a d  p1uWam oga. be den* 
. ,: 
. .. 
turd; onoh denatured ma- do not res&y.hn&tbamd~~~~ to 
the mahng. of atomio tqloeivm, but tbw can still be urjed no 
,-,:. . 
~ t i d  loea of affativeuum for the p d  appliastione+of a m  
, i . < 
. .. 
<- 
- - wuqw. TbeycenbeusediareactoIsforthega~srrrtionofpoweaor 
.. ' ,irt- uaeiul in- and in  production of mdiomt@ , 
t m. It is importmt to undemtmd h . w m e  in w h i c h ' d m a t ~  
- ~dq~-materialsafw, I n f h e h t p h a , i t d & . ~ ~ n m t e P i B I  
-. ' _ 
, -  ~ b y a n y m e ~ w e n o w . b w f m & ~ a t o m I o ~  
&mu#m ntep ars &en to m e  the denntumnte. In the m d  , 
jdam,,#b dew-t of more hgahus methodam #ha W-d 
, . 
d 
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-1 .Ifnatiol ls  or their@- ~ d i n t r b w y  
m t i v i t i t a i t a e e m m t o u e t h B 4 b ~ f a C ! ~  
- 
. 4 
' the futw 
me b o p h  
2. If an i n t m m t i 0 d . m  3:- mispdbility for the 
Mu M a , .  le&* the ~ ~ U B  0~ to ~~ d their 
~ t i z e m a n d ~ ~ ~ ~ i e g i T & n m d ~ ~ ~ ~  
Q---*,-+O*=- 
~ h ~ ~ ~ d a f o m i c ~ d e n s b ~ I W t o ~ ~ e m ~  
end - t h d o m  'detect the d u e  bf atomic wmgy, h is g o d  p e -  
pemE of d t y .  

~ i n ~ t i o ~ ~ ~ t ~ e w q J ~ o i A f o m a , ~ ~  
aa a UNO O o ~ a . ,  or an intanat id  mrpora*n or authority. 
We &id refer tO it m AtOmjo Ddopmemt Authoriw, It must hava 
mthori* to own snd leaPie p r o m ,  and to ctmy on mining, mam- 
-,d, E - w  bpeo-, -9 m a n y o - v  
o p e r a k  
: ~ ~ t e s r i e n o f a n a t ~ p t t o ~ ~ e o o r p o ~ ~ f o r d  
an m ~ t i o m l  agerwg, It ki the be, re&-, to ahow that such a 
ahartar tan be writ- in workabIs terms, and that the natw of the 
orgmhakion and ite funotiomi wi l l  have decisive amaqumm for 
mdd d t y .  We are atidid that the Mmenees between national 
md internlctional operatione can be exploited to make the problem of 
atomio manageable. This id-, we thintr, ean became 9 
fmiW pa the h t  &at the &mems between individual en- 
and corporate enterprise have important o ~ a ~  in the conduet 
of btminms. 
' 
If we are to do angthiag comtmotive in &tion to atomid en* 
it  must inevitably be novd and immwdy -cult. We think that 
the wedm that we have epent in a d p i s  of the probIam have made it 
appm nomewhat less diiEcult and mmowbat hs novel. A w d o n  
s i a u & p o m m s w i I l b e ~ , d b d d h g o n h ~ d b g  
m d p i ~ ,  before even the mejor d c a t i o n s  of bhe problem can be 
und- and the major quatiom partially rrsswared. What is 
dhidy important now is to d d e  the right course of mtion in terma 
mdfwirntly practical end valid to sbaw that the furthm explomtion ie 
-while. 
The propod mntampbta an hkanatiod %mag with &wive 
jmididiion to conduct dl mtrkkdy dangerroue o p t h a  in the 
field. This meaw d ackivitim relsting to raw nut&&, the cmb 
etruction and op~ation of production planh, and #he mndrtct of 
- 
rerwasch in expIo&m. The large field of nondqpmtu and relatively 
nondangmua aktivitiee would be left ia mtiond h d s .  !Fhwe 
would d t  of dl activities in the a d  of m d  (except on ex- 
ploeivm) asd the cornhotion md oparation of nandmgerons 
bm-pmdncing pilea. National # t i f i e p l  in thw fidda would be 
mabject to moderate controls by the inknational ag-, exemid 
through liceoosing, rules and regulatiom, &borntion on design, and 
fhe like. The intamtimal agenoy would a h  main& inspection 
fpilitiea ta &at illicit opmatiom were not marring* prhmily 
in tbe exploibtion of raw materide. It wouM be e farther funation 
gf the Atomic DeveIopmmt AuthoriQ cuntinually to reexamine the 
budq beww darqmua and nowhgmlls d v i k  For it 
mmrt be n c q p h d  .Wt dthongb the field hi eubjwt b maonable . 
- division, the dividing line b not ahatp and may ahif$ from time k 
time in &&ion, 
Ths deralopmmf agmv iW mdd &I tmly international in 
&arm&. Ib would be m t e d  on an b h r m t i o d  b&. 
, Ih fun&- whlld b 4 d  aa to ratfpact a calibre of p e m d  m- 
pmab1e to our own WM~BB @RW
own prima@ probdetbma Itwdd be set up 
c apl one of the ~9, a@3paiss,* '$Fa - NU- but it wudd 
have to be m d k l  b ' b  d?&k$oii 'htatili~hing ib pol- 
' -,- m d a u ~ ~ ~ i D ~ ~ e . ~  . Li :wbtevfs.fhe fmmd agmuab& . * i i Q B i o ~ ~ ~ d  & l M h  #a d'eoume be a9 Bb €&e P~B@ pmbh&' hd@a?r@ 
I ta wsure'h -.degree obt.wmUnbW@ tp wtd N&on& 
P to hdividud Pationsi -b aewrPe *b imdiMdwtim. 
w d d  b v e  ample qgmbuniw b rbe i m f d  of the ,-ogC wW. 
I- -. _ ~ ~ ~ , m ~ b m a k e ~ ~ ~ p o n s i v e t s & e ~ n e e d s ~ o f  
, 
n e M . t a L e s e  weald ~ P B  to be w d e d  o* ~& &8odbry  
aueandingatliq, B n t ~ o u r ~ c e w i h b ~ ~  
- govwnment btitntiow, n a W .  d intwdbd, would &ad a 
r w d t h d  guidaeoe in h ~ v e l o ~ ~ t  d.m& al~uHS* 
, . In the oonductdite w t i o n s  d m e l o p m ~ q a n h t i a n  
w o u l d a t d l h e e b e g o ~ ~ B y w d u a l ~ ,  ~ p r o ~ ~ c m o f ~  
b&dd WXI J s t o m i o ~ & & h e ~ h m c e  of+sum&y. We 
b e l i e v e t h a t ~ ~ b e b e i n ~ ~ a ~ p r ~ f o & t h e s e  . 
p- mmr& d WE&, C-dmw & lisls bqheen the dmgmtm 
apd t$e non&mgmwI to mtaMisb the p w k  debmining &a 
. ~ o f ~ k a n d p b 5 % B p ~ ; a r ~ b a l ~ m t r y b e  
lmawahed bmosg mkbm, to ~ ~ h ~ ~ .  and equitable h a w i d  
p h k  BO &at tihe mbibtlt iom of naiihm to, m d  their &@ of 
b d t a  fmm, the oqgdmtion will be jw&ly appofioned. The mt 
~ a r i d ~ ~ d ~ ~ ~ w i a . b s ~ ~ i a o r d e r t o  aQopm- 
~u-~lupoass.  
In w b t  followm we ehen attempt b M o p  snal q m d  the for+ 
sing rbahnent of ~ e n t h h  
We - beet &he dtomio D e m ~ m m t  A u W b  in kmns 
d tSbe mewar to theee wmb q u m h  
I- '".' (1) What nin be thihmctions of theapcy; abst am the things 1: &at it will do? ' . (a) what kind ot +ad neeasssrg to carrg out *~BB Prmctiomt (3) Boa d the oqmhtio11 be related to the Unitsd Natfom 
t and tbs'mdiv#id n u b  that it nlll * M t ?  
Wnht polioies wi l l  gaids ths agmq in d d m n h i q  its 
CHAPTER I 
Fundions of Atomlc hvelopment Authority 
In the$& Qf ~QCP -The b t  P ~ O W  of the agenay d 
'6e to bring under ita complete mnh1 war14 auppliea of d u m  and 
M u m .  Whmver theae rnakrhds are found ia wfa l  qwtitiea 
the hh3l8~0d wq 0- tbm Or rnn-1 them 
affective leaeing mmgmuanh~. One of ite principal  task^ will be b 
conduct continuous men so that new depmita win be found aad 
that the agmoy wilt have the mast compleh knowIedp of the w d d  
p l o w  of theeb matmiah It M be a further funatie~ of the may 
wmtantly to explore n m  methods for remering thebwmabrhb horn 
media in which they sre found in BmPll quantities. 
In this way there will be no lawful rivalry among nations for these 
vital raw mstarials. Though ita surveys the a g m ~  wi l l  be bettea 
informed about their ~ 1 0 g y  and extrsction than any aingle nation 
could powibly be. It will be in a b e t k  position to diamver whether 
and where illicit operatiom might omur than my inepection form 
mdd possibly be. Thia ie net to my that there ia no rhk of illicit 
operations; m y  plm, any sgstem of wfegumb, involves some risk. 
The question that must be m e r e d  in appmising the dsngere is 
whether the riak ia BO large that it ia better to make no sttempt at 
internetiod control and abandon the world to national atomic 
rirmment. 
As we have pointd out earlim, if the AtQmio Development Authorits 
i the ody agency which may l o t w f d y  operate in the raw msteriale 
field, then my visible eperation by others wi l l  conatitnta a danger 
aignsl, Tbiir situation contraste vividly with the conditions thst w d d  
exist if nations agreed to tmnduat mining oparations solely for proper 
purpoaea; for amptitiow abuse of such an rrgraement would be 
~ s r y  W c u l t  to detect. It is far endear to discover an oparntion that 
&odd not be going on at all than to determine whether a hwfd 
oparation ia being conducted in en unlawful manner. 
For &the purpose of its m e y s ,  the intarnational agw would 
require a w 8 ~  to vmiou~ mtiom for its gaologista md mining engineers. 
But the known geology of the critical rnetwi&h is such that it may be 
possibIe b l i d  the degrea of acorn from the s M .  hi, a9 explore 
&.& & hd A*\&  
tdha~rEgh~&famFa bany  region for 
bW1edge d d  be n m .  
tue:Wucted by Wi A~thoriiy~ ' I3would  ow^ and opemb J- 
h e r i e ~ f o r t h e & ~ h o b & e ~ C ~ e r n e t a l ~ d ~  
-'the ~ h k p 9 ~  of . tb~~mrrt&b and it would d hwb& 
ucts, mi& as&m tmd mdhm. It wodd slao pmv& themace%; 
n&y s u p  bl d imt .nd  &orium for ths pmmt limited- 
mmkd lk. Au tllwJa d m  would ~ ~ b l y  go ~ u g h - ~  
mm&daE *a. 
Inf the fidd d row m&&bhs m-o&er aatipitim of the Addtg: ,  
n e l y  Wdt policy poestb~ls, with then mt adow W: 
d lp&tkd1hpb&ns, d h, HOW d d  r ~ r h  
md indid& ba wrnpenateil for m m r v ~ ,  *en over by tha 
Authority? As between several p k b l e  mines in different awmb - 
*KCh'%br9, be 0 ~ - &  W~PID. is d~ kbt  hh0 90tp~t  of fd b J I Q ~  
p&mtay l ~ g u h d t  How elm a strategic b h m e  be mtLinkkd - 
betwm =tiom so that skukpib  of f k b a b h  111&b&b will no& - 
-me d u l y  large in o m  nation 4 d in motha? We:do 
not a tqga t  Wt e m  q u d o m  am -le but we beZiwa that praes 
tical answers cm be found. An attempt to suggast an s p p d  to 
s n & ~ m ~ m a d e w w h e r e t h e ~ q u & 0 1 ] d ~ o f '  
the B u t h e  is diammd. fi 
~~ P h t & 4 h  uwad major fmdih of the Authoriw 1 
d be the mnstxuetion and operation of d u l  tme, of sbmio 
EaCbr8 end mpm&on p h b .  Tki nrosne that opemtione, me t 
" those at -Ed and Oah Ridge a d  their ~ ~ & O I W  and improve- i 
- , menbs, would be me"n d d w t e d  by the AuhriQ. Beactors ,'a 
for prodndg d~~ plttbnium will be large b W a t i o 0 8  trad by i! 
the nature of. tho p h  they wiIl yield large mods of emqg ae a I 
b p d l c t . '  ile &e M q g  of power developant by tb mehhod &, &, ways will be f o d  for n t E q  ihia pow- both rn heat d 
as elwtricity. The exkiting planta am not d-d b oponrte at a ; 
ad3ioiently high tempemhire for the en- to be used for &e 
stion of electrid power. h e  of tbe fmt meamh a d  devalopmmt 
prob1ma of the AnthoritJr wwld be to develop of faeo- 
mch that the en- d e w d  would be in form mble  fur the gene&. 
stion of dee&ic pow=. 
Thm produotion phtrr ase f ' ' ' Uy dmgcm 
I r m d e e d t h e y a s a y b e ~ d ~ r e ~ m a e t ~ n a , f o r  
mch o p m t i m  b t  P U L ~ & ~  cxm be pmduced W 
for atomic eapldva. 
\ - 
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h addition ta questions ah& to them mentioned i the esee d 
raw mot&&, mmy pew a m  suggest h m m l v ~ ~  m reletinn h a w b  
@u&mphS. ~ t m e a s u r e a c a n b e t s k m t o ~ ~ ~  
mum degree of dangm in dm@ of p h t a  and output? What m a m ~  
be telrm to amme the minimum dengeF of diveraim? Wbrtt 
m e  can be taken to mure l w a b  of plaab that both 
permif the &@tion of bypduat power d hest in rrreas dm 
they are most needed d st the m u e  h a  wiU U h i n  a stratqia 
h m  behween natiom so that none map be fnspki with iesr 
1st the & ~ C B  of plmte in another would give that nation sn 
ndvauhge if it suddenlg devalopd awimive inknitionat How wiU 
the vast amouuba of byproduct pow* be ch& of by en ink- 
~rtional aganay operating pgmbicelly - a aakhd econohy? 
Lilre tho quwtiona p m i o ~ - ~ t a r ~ ,  &me, not emy to answer. 
But here again we think th t~spswtm cen -be fomd and we vaturn 
lam to mg@ ru wmy of going the procasa of formulating 
mmvma. 
h s w e l i  -we have 8 h d y  r e f 4  to the d that 
&a Authority will d u c t  to extand the fidd of howledge in relation 
to recovmbb raw ~~1&td&. We have r e f d  to in power 
devdopmmk Them will be many other forms of & in WE& 
the Autboritg will have to engage, dating to a i m p m  rmctom 
and the like. 
Here we desire to e p l p W e  that the field of reeearch in ita broadest 
m e  is tbe field ia which the p m h t  opportunitien preeent &em- 
salw for mtional and primk advitiea. For mmmh in relation 
to the application of diswveriea relating to atomic energy is a gresb 
mes of work which in the context of the generaL plan of saf- 
hamin proposed ie n o ~ . d p g m u e ,  For the m n a  a h d y  M a t e d  
I the Authoritfr iW will have to engage in a wide d a t y  of reseamh 
dvi t iw.  FOF -pie, one of the important things thab the Au- 
thori4iywiUhavetodo.isdinafomicempIOem~~. W e m b y  
no mama ~ u r e  that imporhut new dieoov& io tbis field do not lie 
ahead. P d I y  the s t u d y  of +vm q yield bypmducta 
u d  in pweful mtiviti~~. But thia will not be the main purpose 
of the Author i~ '~  research. M y  by prmmhg ih position aa the 
beat informed agenay will the Authority be able to tell whm the h e  
be- the intrimidly dmgmus and the nondmgcmu~ &odd be 
drawn. If it t u ~ n a  out at mme time in the future, &a 8 d t  ofnew 
h v e r i e s ,  that other materials lend them~alv~~ to dang8xy)us atomio 
developmmta, it ia important that the Authority ehould be the h t  
to h o w .  At that timemeasu~ea would have to be taka Eo W 
the bounddm of eafegumia. 

( 1  
d e  to build md opmte &m of vuiona~'iu,n-dmgapw 
E& h p m m d  of the Authority mdd have acceq to the  bhb 
Mimat ,in whioh mch materid is d Moreover, throw i@ 
own r e e d  and development autiaitiw and through eatabljdhg 
mape~etive dahmhipn with resew& d ddopmant laborntorim 
in thie field throughout the wodd, the Authority 'wodd .b in a p i -  
tion ta determine hWgenE1y d e  md d e  des ip  of rcw&m 
for which it might ham ita hsbmble mahxkb. 
In the foll~wing paragraph we &dl refer to three of the g e n d  
typea of activitim of peat impmhnce in the M d  of atomic en- 
w b h ,  ae lalready indicated, are or - be made s&cimtly safo to b 
& on by natiom under adtable amngmnenta with the propowd 
Authority. Thaa tmetr of d v i t y ,  as we have pointed out e a r k ,  
open up a broad a d  for national and private expIoitation of the use- 
ful ~rppliatiom of ak t lh  q. In particutaf, they wi l l  pBfmit 
b d  soo~e for and developmmt in this field by natiom and 
priv& groups within such mtiom. 
One of the h t  l k d n g  activitim of the Au&& might b i n  t4e 
M d  of r e e e d  rawtom for whi& it would fumbh on 1- denat& 
plutonium or U 236. In & on such opemtio~lil, pwmabIy 
tho88 deeiFitlg to build such dma&m wodd submit their 
d @ p  b tha AuthoPiQ both for appmal d for advice rn to ina- 
provements, end would obtain a l i w w  to build euch a reactor and 
h of the denatured &donab  material ne,add for it. There would 
be a minimum of danger involvd in do* the mostruction and 
operation of march reactam not exceeding a prsswibed power l e d .  
As we have mm, the smomta of bsbmbla mataria1 whIoh might be 
produced through their use would be 8o malI that for any individual 
unit, or wen fw mita in one cumtry which might number a dozen ox 
more, there w e d  be no real danger in terms of producing m a w  - 
dEcieat for ust, in atomic expldves. Pmmably the Authority 
h m  time to time would send i& pemnnel, in the dual role 
of dworkem md bpedtws, to the Lbmtoriea in which these 
reuctom ware wed, but a minimal inspection would lm d e d .  Mort+ 
over, such m a r c h  reactors would f.I1Jfin. to a large abnt the urgent 
mquirammta for further intemive sdentb resemah in this field. 
Mumably licams and leasea of m a t e d  would be arranged between 
the Authority and individual nationa w that &he Authority would not 
be dadkg h t l y  with private group within nations, 
The Auhhority would also limme and leaae in the same manner aa 
deshbed for r e a d  reactow the aonatruction and operation of 
reactom for radioactiva matmida. There may well be, aa 
suggested above, a field for the mtiod  or private pmduoion of 
~ u c h  radioactive ma- which will require a pile to pmdum mate 
*I&%* have to b1-b F€Wimed, nnd 
oonvt&iih & a b Fo~l-pb, here &odd7 
be rim p d b ~  dthin a& fop &a in- of &am DPJ 
- 
thorium. Iron or.M mi&L ba rquimd rrs s t r u c h d  materi&i&, -' 
if warerw made ~-rmmmibIe, t h e  would b a  k g a  factor of 
d e w  +t &use, Such power -tom wauM !'bum" tho =ti70 
mu&%& and wquiFe r ~ ?  b m  time to h.The &&xiable 
materiale hr BU& powmrwcb muId be M d  b m  oparation 
d the phductian plrrarts at &e LqPutlaori.ty. There im w -peat h t  
l i c d ,  for the rawon h t  &me .would no6 be wugh fiasiumhle . 
when ddabm will be rquhdl 
t b o f t h e A u h ~ w i l l & d m  
~~~ for ehein dubion. Hem w UBntmr be nexwcw . 
~ t I y ~ ~ l ~ u g h b o m u m t b £ r % e & d ~ t k m d ~ d ~ v a t e ~  
prim without &k to d k y Y  Bow &dl f@W md rnakwhda 
, 
W dearnot rminimiPn the 
am to be.d mmaapabb 
d e M  bo facilibb dntims. 
J ~ d m  ddwdam- . .. Thmghout this reporb we k v e  r#!qdpd 
our mnvidioa that h h m t i d  qpammb ta foreamem %,af 
e w e  c i f a b m i u w e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  b e d d d d y  byTa7q-aWa@ 
b & - ~ ~ d b d a r c s d h 8 r ~ g % ~ ~ ~ ~  
the devdopment of - M y  dangarom d&ies,  in tb,&eld ,# 
atomic an- in m d i q d  h m b  md-subjwt to n&ia&ml 
tu h u m  ags inst .d i4mi  of bct iv ih  t0_,-,-& 
. d i m  npaa). m-n by an qpktq ~wW Jm~rlpe- 
Put hp&m iaiaJmhhdtsbd h h . k ~ m & & ~  
-tiom of the Atomio Dedopmmt Authdiy-it ha a-pmpep. 
m d e m m t k l p ~ ,  s O m e t i m e e i t m a y ~ ~ a f o m ~ y r e c q p .  
&able rn inspention, but h t  may be d e d  as one of h virhm 
of the ppossl. 
Itmayattheo11teetbeusefultoredlwmeof hfwtorrr1~Wa 
had us to b&eve thsf as s hetion of tha A b f i o  D&oelopmmt 
B U M @  hpe&on om be d d v e .  We-do not by W wiah b 
' mgpt that the necresrilaPg ~~ f m c h  trim or that 
t hq  can be camid ott* without inveativewm a d  effort. We do 
M a v e  that the pro@ of this q o r t  m t e  e fmework w i t h  
whi& euah inventivanearr and m& dort cm be deativa 
In the inspection of d W  and legd pctivitb-to b sum that 
&8y am really legal-it ie of the greatestadmmtags thst the operetiom 
can t b d v b ~  be so oonducted aa k make &b inspatiom md mntrol 
easy. The Atomic Dw&psaat Autherity mill have the doubh re 
spom'bility of ~~ efiwtiva development, and of safety. It 
would be in a position to insure that in the plan of openrtlom, in the 
ph@d layout, in the eyatam of audits, m d  in the choice of devdop- 
mmte, full weight and full mnddmtion can be given to the ease of 
detmting arad evoidtng 8 m h  d evasion. Thw, the AuthoEiB 
may mnrseiwsbly h d  it unwi5a3to e2tpluit a w h h  types of d@b 
h u m  of the Mcultim they preud tQ adequate auditing. TBe 
Authority m y  haw maam to deoids on o m  ar wthm MOW of tbe 
mparation of isotopes b m m  it lende iW more resdily to oontrd. 
In the bation of itdl operatiom, it WiU be in a position to take into 
amount politid and Sgciological f-rn which might mAkR mntwl 
diBdt, or to allow such d d e r a t i m  to iduence ita & ~ i w  d 
0 ~ t h  p d  *nd w9 m b  wd&t b h 
importan08 of unifyhg at the planaing stage the mqukmenta d d e  
dopment and conhl. W e  also athch great weight to the fm 
r e d k g  inseparability of the two functiom in the p a m d  of 4xe 
dwelopment authority . 
ds we have pointed out repeatdy, the A u h r i ~  d be aided in 
tbe dehction of 1@ opemtiom by the faat tbst it is not tbe motive 
but the operation whieh is illegal. national or privnfe &ort to 
mine uranium wiU be illegal; my mch s h k p i b g  of thorium Ria be 
illegal; the bddiag of any primsrg -tar or m t i m  plant win be 
in@. T b  oircumabanm ia of very greet imprtsnoe for the follow- 
ing m r i :  It ia true t b t  B tho~oagbgoing ~~n of all phases of 
the indw- of n netion will in g e n d  be an udmmble burden; it i~ 
true thef s addated attempt at evssion m y ,  by #mdhge or by 
geographical loo&tion, malre the qmih &MOIL of an &gd opem- 
tion very mu& more ditbult. Bu6 the totsl &ort d e d  to wcq 
thtoughfromtQeminetothebomb,ammptit2ouspragramd 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ n & a b r ~ t s m a k e i t 6 t h r e a t o r b &  
it a b m p t r r ~  to mado& ia so' vsst, and tb'nlrmber of mpaxab 
d B d t  n d i  ao *tr, bn;l 'tho speeial -h?r of many of 
thekl- m bar& to COW, that tihe fsat d tl& &o&' 
&odd b impdble to Bide: The fact $bat it ia the a x i s h c e  of th? 
dfmt mthw a p e d a  parpio&M?@ofive or plan whioh cornti- 
t a ~ m ~ , e v d m i r n d m ~ b l 6 ~ $ g & i l m b w r m i n d s  
we of the &st ndp4p1+ t &B'$~O$W&'~ h t d  optlined. 
We'have &&dw d&s&td't&a d&Iddl~&ok prwididg 
in an inapeoh agenw pammmd with the quf l c~ t ioaa  n e c w  
f b ~  &it worlr', a d  w&h dghtened and ~ t l y ' i m p m d q  -dm- 
standing of thm tmMd hdities. We believe that th~d'grob1mm 
can be adlved m mi A ~ o  Development Authority h iphtoh 51 
dmat4d th0 Witihicd explmtioa of h field, and h~ which irlspmtim' 
&tiw will  be d d  out in part by the very pemmd f ~ p o d b l e  
for the mw dedophei~t;S and in pwt by the men af the samo wgd- 
sation, who have a- to, and who have m interest in, the r d  
md dmdopmeolt &tiei of the Auth&@. We do not wish fo 
ohemPbm&t the advan- that mhy mhs h m  the h e  asadation 
of the du&ori~'e scimtbb and &pwb with thOge emgaged in privah 
m t i b d  und-, but we believe h t  if a &us &fort is d e  
b 3 ti& this m&tion it will greatly reduce t l i ~  ohapw'of e& 
mitiod or mta ation, or of the existace, mhibwn to the Author- 
ity, bf tddcd devdopmenta which might codtute a potantid ' 
drmgar. AB aa BXB~PIB of an m & t i o d  which w04d on bMd 
b m b  be most sp-te for the &i&&iW, we may cite the 
- lem df pmr. The A- d R  ba'mgagd in 'the pradmtiori d 
pww. X t w i l l b e ~ i n ~ ~ p t e h t s o f n m d ~ ~  
tsp6 for krimte or national o p d a n .  'It &odd t ike advtphge of 
tbae ammiations to be informed about b powmrqniremmts which 
phy so large s pmt in the op-emtian of eepmtion plants. 
It will be seen that we do not tmn-pbte any qatemstic or -8- 
scale hapation *tics for the Auth~ty excqit those directed to 
the control of raw ~~. -It irs rnul hope-md we bliwe it s 
valid hope-that d m  tha Aa'thmiw is in f$ll operation it will, 
through the. application of hgemuiQ to the probIcun, have ob-d 
a su$ni&tJy compfeta con-1 dver raw materiala and the fddna'ble 
prbducts'rro tbst no elabarata and formal J,tion procednros win 
b~ needed to supplemeat it. It ie dear that h d  decision on this 
hstter must M m  into e t  the mmte of tber u t i m  p h d  
h n  oirr m t  cmditi0n.b that of the full operation of the A d =  
. 'It is dtw dear that the more mfidly the iniW d t e p  bdhg tQ: 
the Autdmriw ddntrpi of mw maM& .me W, '&e '&d ' 
. dunce of'& dMimktinh of &emom btwdemome fotohtat'-- 
~ ~ o g i d m m e ~ r , w h i h i n a a a w e ~ ~ w i l l h e ~ d  
en a world-wide and a m s g  for the d h m s r g r  of the aseentiaI 
mw mteds, In the conduct of memh and developmeat, mid 
mugh the looation of fdle Authority's ltrboratoriea in nrbus prh 
of the world, the Authority abwld became cognizant of a wide range 
of m& and development aotivitia in various muntk. Their+ 
fore, the purpose of inspwtiou would be m e d  in that posne l  of, 
the Aubority abould be cwent ly  md intdipntls; infoxud regmi- 
iug. nationd and private research and dewhpment d x i i i i ~  Hz thh 
fidd. 
In operating h a ,  r-as, mi primary production plmb in 
various muntries, the permud of the A u b r i Q  will like& &.c- 
quire wt m@hg bhe aotivitiee and trends in vdom countriw. 
In ib mtivib the Authori~ dl maintain w n h t  with 
the m d  end development laborahrk authorized to use rwtnre. 
E*ogange of p e ~ ~ ~ n n e l ,  vieita, and even fonnal ilzspeotion, may all 
be hmlved. 
Ln li- power reactors which me somewhat lea safe thm 
r w h  reactom, the Authorits would m d  ita r e p ~ t a t i v m  b 
hpwt or visit thw plants at frequent inkmals. Such pers0na.d 
would ~ ~ b l y  be trained in tbe development or engin& 
bmchea of the Authority md their ptimary purpose might wBn be 
to fwd& e n g k d q  m v i w  and advice to the operatem. ' A e  
inspection that would a d u d y  mult would be bar more effective than 
any direot a t a p t  b hpeot. 
Undsr the nlt ians deemibd between thd A u b r i ~  and m&ul 
or priyate group using demtured hionable matetial, the inspeotora 
would have a right of awma deriving from the t e r n  of. the h m e  
H b. Fwthmore, if the Authority conducted the operations 
d d b e d ,  it would have within ita organhatian a unique hawledge 
of the whold field of atomic en- and the changes in that fidd, 
which ma b m t  certain b be rapid if it ie developed in a heal* 
manner. To the e x h t  b@on was required it could be done by 
competent engineers or soientista whg would be far more knowl- 
edgeable than those inspected m d  who muId fur&& useful aid d 
advice at the m e  time. 
In the mume of ib  activitim, the Authori@ migkt acquire informa- 
tion which would cause it to suspect ev-m or violations in p h a  to 
which it did not have the right of acceaa for geological swey  or for 
inspection of instdhtioas using laud material. Some meam would 
have to ba provided so h t  the Authority by amking out a prima facie 
caee would be granbd mese to tlpe m p e M  plant or labomhy. 
Thi~ might be ammgd k u g h  the presentation of such a quest to 
some htornatisnal body 811th tu the I n h m t h d  O(turt. If &a Court 
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w m  ad With the adq- of 9 e  XBMOIU presmhd by the 
: &tho+, it mi&$ thsn rqu& tha nation in which the mpeated 
&vih were locatad t a p f  mxwa to repmwnhti~a of the Au- 
&mi*. ~ ~ t o u s ~ o f ~ 0 ~ l e m e & n s o f & p p r o ~ t o t h o  
' limitd *em of of qvdms that w d d  bs pment'svan 
I 
O~mizufTon and Polfcles of bit Dhm!opment Adhorlfy 
In the light of the mientifie and techaohgkd I& end of broad 
human and political factors, we have undd&an, up to this point, to 
desmih the kind of functions h t  an A b t i a  Development Authoriw 
would have to be gimn in order to be &tivs. In mneidming the 
problems of orgdational structure and detkiled policies for much an 
arlthority it is dm clew that t h ~  fwta ooncmhg atomic energy are 
decidedly pertinent. But ils to these problm, there ia much ralevant 
qerience in the general field of international orght iog .  Obvi- 
ously the ~ystematic approach ne- for a dution of theee 
problem must draw heevily on that experientle. 
But there is an impmht question of thing. It would be pre- 
mature now to s& definitive -em to many of the questiona to . 
organization and poliq. For in order to have validiQ the answers 
will b v e  ta be the product of intamtionid dimmion and deliberation 
rather tbm any unilateral statement of a detailed plan. 
In considering the type of oqmisational problem involved in set- 
ting up an Atomic Development Authorits under the Unibd Nations, 
it should be r e d l y  podble to h d  helpful d o g i e s  in other inter- 
nationd operations, pubIia and private, and even in national wtivi- 
tiea. In the mum of our discnssions numerous quations cunming 
these matters have naturally occurred to us as they would to anyone 
etudying the i a m t i o d  issues meakd by atomic margg. It baa 
been newary to d e c t  intensively on t h ~  poasible answim ta such 
questiom m a meuna of testing the mundnea of our main condwiom. 
We pment here Borne of the reclulta of our own &cumion and ratlets 
tion, not in the form of a sptematic atatemmt but rather for the 
purpose of illuetrethg the tlVpes of questiona that and possible 
anrtwem which owmed to this group. 
One of the key problems of mum will be the quaetion of pparaonnel. 
It will be of the -ce ta recruit that pemnnel on a truly in&- 
national h i s ,  giving much weight to geographid aad national 
dbtribution. It do- not seem to ue an umeamnable hope that the 
organization would attract personnel of high quality. For the field 
of h0wledg8 i8 one in which the prospecte for future development 
have bmme an absorbii in-t of the entire world. Cerhinly 
d 
ibwi r -s  fm bdim h c e  th& ~ J w  A n k l ~ r i ~ ~ ~ o ~ d d  eCfrsot pmmmd 
oP r high dik:Wa U  an^ ptdg  p o I i ~ . ~ t i ~ p  would 
hw.1 d b ~ ~ i t i t i s ~ - t h e m ~ o f t h e o ~ t i o n  
d & p m d a p t h e q t ? a l i @ o f h ~  . 
-, mwe, 
. m e q  rspwt8, fmgiwm, phyfi&& d k m i h ,  and other pamnnd, 
a d  evergpdbhebrbmmtbmadebsestsbhhthekindof orp& 
- qLtbnfagtWiu-- 
c i  It h m k  s l o n e - m  ht the mtib to be thomugbIy in- 
J o n n e d m ~ . W d a f ~ c . ~ , .  I X I f l 1 J s o l x 1 ~ f o r t h e  
~ l l ~ k i o m o f i t h ~ w m l d t a ~ ~ y ~ d  Jdltimeaaboutthe 
npamkbna of .the dutI~&@~ Thme rre ways of thig 
t b ~ . a a d ~ b w ~ ~ i t w i l l b e .  Someiabgd
wgandtheUnikdNs~~~tbebari~Councilitself, will 
d t a  m e  as t?w uvmmhg bady,far ib A u W &  But it 
osdddo so m m g e m d l y  ~ 4 m p d h  bo th- mpbyed byawn- 
- . . rrraab*~cmmi4~& WBaeou 
d hhp,Bub- L o . ~ v ~ u t n l  i q t i t u b s  h.tbe U&d 
W. DebiId mmmm vould-have to be mrkd ost,to atmm 
W mere cmm~tim beOweam - 9 1 1 & ' ' r m . o ~ ~  or, " a c - c o ~ ~ ~ i t y "  
body and the Atomio Devdopment Authority itdf. Ways. w@l &I 
h n ~ e t o b w o r g e d o u t t o ~ ~ t i a d i v i d d m t i i o ~ l s m s ~ r ~ t a i n  
m m g h d i r e c t a m ~ w i b h t b e ~ t i o n t o g i ~ e ~ s  r m m d q f  
b h t e ~ w i t b i b ,  ~ n e e d w i u b e ~ ~ ~ ~ e d i r r ~ ~ b ~ ~  
fsct that t h e H  of the- . will be d t a d  fPom v w h a  
natbditiea The qxdiom &.the A u M @  in its bx&g =ti& 
~ h i t r P i l l b e ~ ~ t l y w i ~ ~ d s t a ~ , W i u *  
ba one of the w 8 p  in whW fbie objdive is 1woomplish9d War in 
thb fid thwe fl be cmmht dlmmtion betweap tbs A u W Q  
4 individual sktes in working out .fhe detailed h t i f i a ,  tdmologi- 
t aal, and palitid p b h  which m i l l  dwhr mud the Authoriby's 
I 
L h n & g  d v i t h .  NOPB of b x ~  appetm bo present 
in~~uparnble d&dtk  
The foqping is inhnded m d y  ma a statanent of the possibilitiw 
for act* ensting an orgmhtioa that wiU ham s o d  relatiom 
with &e U n i  a and with individual s t a b ,  T h  psibilk 
fiee muat be made the aubjeat of further asploration as i n t d v 8  ma 
that which we have W t e d  to the &tXc and ~ 0 1 ~  ftrote . 
coatomaing atomic en- itself. 
Until q&ed men set thmmdm the twk of atrtudy wriw g 
darh,  dmpw by ahapk, an- eaid about poP& m@ be 
~ b ~ ~ o f p f ~  T h e b u d e h ~ t o b p Q i i ~ ~ h . 0 h e  
form of organization, will have fo grow out of t h e + h i t ~ ~ ~ k W & ~ &  
cudom and deliberetione. 
1 fib] 
The fbdmmU govmhg the Abmio Dw&pment':&uWy 
muat of oouw be tho88 w W  have h *so, well stated in the'riaIu- 
tion of Jmuary 18,1946 mtting up the United Natiom A m  En-
Commirssioa, a t  hat, the e b n g k m h g  of d t y  aad the pkmotim 
of the bemddd use of &tomb en-. In our wport we haPe &ptd 
ae the h t  principle in the acmmpliahment d these fnmbentd  ob. 
j d v e s  the propcdkion that intrj,sicslly dmgwotm 8 0 ~ ~  in the 
field must not be left open to national rivalry but mwt be p k d  in 
truly internationd h d e .  To eetablieb the boundaria between in- 
k m t i o n t r l  and national d o n ,  we have grasped the fortunate & 
c m -  that a dividing h e  cun be b w m  between dmpmw md 
~ r u r g e r o u ~  activities. We have emphdmd that not th8 k t  in 
the fortunate tircumahm that we have 0-d i~ the fsot that the 
fidd of non*mUt¶ wtlvitha is rro c h a l l e  that it pro* as 
opportuniw to a v 6 d . d  ~ e a ~ b d h t i o n  f autdrorifg as might make 
the prim of mudy wem too high. In thb cmnwtion it itr imporEant 
that 8 plll'pdd &Wb &odd be made b k* Ba br0d lrnd d i ~ d -  
fified - 1 ~ h f i e e d  of hviw whinhh I& lltcti~aa~ e n d ~ ~ a t e  
hands. Emy dmt must be mede M avoid omhdhhg exdutaivdy 
in theduthority m y  m m  sCtiv%b~ than we essenM for p q a m  of 
d t y .  
These aren the kind of bmh m m i d ~ ~ 8 h  which we &sinme the  
United Natian~ Atomic Energy Gbmmidon would to make 
-licit in ib rewmmenczlstions for the ohark of axl A- Dwdop 
ment Authority. Many others tun be added b the kt. We mention 
some now which are typical and inwtmtive asd which are dmm 
from the kind of que~tiom which have &en in out o m  h d o n s .  
We would expect tbttt the charter iW &odd, so far as practiable, 
d b  the areaa that b e  dwly dmpous, in whi& there must be aa 
excldve intmmtionsl operation, and the B T ~  which now ~ e e m  - 
clearly nondmpow, in whi& there may be natiod and prikte 
opemtio~llg. One d the most diflicult problems wiU be Ehe criutioa 
of chartar provisione and dmhbttative governing the 
~ w i n w h i & f h e l i n e w i U b o ~ ~ 1 1 b e t F R ~ ~ n s a f e ~ a n d ~  
near the middle of the spectrum of activitk whew the dipision 
b o r n @  1- sharp. Another mcult problem will be to provide the 
m d  to r e d b e  as e i k  " ~ m w r '  OF "de" when new knowl- 
. edge &ifb the line. Jn them matt- dm questions wi l l  a&q of 
I 
mume, as to the h e e  which mwt be r e f w d  for approval to the 
individual nations, the issum which need ody be referred to eome i 
o m  of the klnited Natiw, like the burits C m d ,  and the h m  
which can be dehmhed by dmhhfrative wtion of the Atomic I 
DwBLOpment AuthoriQ it&, 1 
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&thin OW ON, s ' m b  'a hb+e -k ablished. It 'is ':not 
thought '#at the' Atbhio Ddvd@'df 'Aupority m l d  pmht  .ib 
p M  69. milit& fom fro& 'the d h q i h h i u g  m a w  of fhe mation 
in && they .am situatLd 86aeaU&t'Qd' ~atk11s milhiq9m 
3zqqy'b desMAe'. -Bit; aD rnmt,'iti b o r n  bh Iitfle more tbn ti hfm: 
, ' !I% p m W n  WiIil%e' in &e.bt a t  if sng mi5on-k&e$:t%d 
!plants or @e ~tmkpile~ hat are sitmted in its *top, other nh- 
*'have d~&&~faciIltiee aha materials & ~ t @  &air awn 
dividon of p h t s  a d  facl&iea h d  gbdcpilm, wil? aka b nmswyi 
&me of &&a bve %een &dd to,"' pe d m i g ~  of p- 
prodqtibn phnL should indm thorn I L ~  &tIo &gemus ad p d b b .  
fib'#qkpiIe!d s ' s f i x m e  mitablo far tbe of boqibs &odd 
b'kbpt &a aa &Ida 'bhdifent ifti& reasible ~ ~ , M ) ~ I c L I  airs 
I /agin&. '6 far m p~~eticabla, b a l d  be dematmd d 
',I kept in H. ~ 1 ~ d ' ~ t a ~ ' ~ ~ ~ a  Pv. the pmdubkio'o 3 M9ib. 
4 1 k & & ~ c q 4 & ~ m d 6 ~ w ~ & ~ 1 ~  
1 , : f ! . ~ , &  I . . <  u.1 
- - - .---- - . 1?-7!!c .;- , . -- 1' . p,: :, [ i d  I,, 
s .  - k*clLLq- I .  .R- 
- Ri :I. - 
pwmt the ~ u l a d i o p  of mbhntkl BrnOante of mate* quMy 
c o n ~ d b l e  mto imporbt qusntiticm of qlmive8. 
sll.tlqeiw mttm mmt be the mbject of the mmt oareful dh 
tion in the writing of tbe dwtm itself. 
- With appropriate world-wide distribution of shkp3811 end fd- 
ith; with d ~ i g n  rend& M lsttle hgcmus as possible; with 
etockpilea of darrgarous ~~ kept at the loweat Ievd cwnaistpmt 
with good erwnomiaa and engbdng;  there wil l  be no need for r 
m e  of k c u r i t y  on the pa& of any of the major pow-, S&ma 
d o r d  no k m e d k t a  tactical ad&-. They would in fact 
be an batmtaneous drama! ic dmger signsl, and they would prznit* 
under the conditiom ebted, a mbstantlax period of time for other 
m t h  to take all possible measurm of dd-. For it should be 
borne in mind that even if facilities are wM, a year or more would 
be required after h e  before atomio weapone could be produoed 
in qumtities dlicient to have ma important hflu~~1oe n the outcome 
of war. Considering the peycholopid fwkim in pubh opinio~, the 
fixing of danger signale that are clear, simpla, and vivid rseemrs to us 
of utmost impartsnc%. 
There are other W c  p r o b l ~ ~ ~  of only Wtly 1- &Bcdty whi& 
will also need to Im d d t  with in the international dalibtiow. 
These have to do with BU& mattma as mpensatTo11 to nations end 
private agencies for *e raw which the Authority would 
take over, they heve to do with the problem of initial h c i n g ,  fhey 
have to do with aflocationa and distribution of the materials md the 
facilitiee which the Authority will liceme or a d  to individual nations 
and, thugh  them, to their citimw. One of the diffiodt problems 
in this respat will be the question of priority in ~tablishing non- 
dangerous power planta within various nations m d  the relation 
between thase l i d  act iv i~a  nd the powe~pmduchg aciivitim - 
of the Authority itiself. A apocial word made to be s d  oa tbie 
aubjmt. 
The needs of nationn for new pow- resources varg not only with 
indwtrid mnditiom, but a h  with their p e t y  to w a b  pow*, 
4, end petrolem h we have emphhed befom, the power mp 
ply from fissionable materials i of two entirely dirrtinct kinds. Power 
will be produd in t h e  very pro- of opmting tbe pmduction 
plants which make fissiombIe m a W .  Thme p b t e  we of tbe 
dmgemus kind which muat be owned and operated by the Authority. - 
The decisive d d m t i o n  in d e k m h h g  the locakion of such plant@- 
will have to be strakgit; otherwise the physical balance between an- 
tione will be impaid. In o b  worda, the distribution of them 
p b b  throughout the world will have b be hied p r h d y  on iw 
curib conaideratione. But them will stiU be ample room for an in- 
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P M u a l  mtion, once it is dddd that such 8 plant can bo Iocahd 
within ita borders, to debmine where tho plant &dl be dtueted in 
relation to ifg own economk and d d  neads. It also nppem fair 
I to wume thst the charter mold provide spe*ficdy for tho Authority 
to tun the pow= over b the nation or its daignee at the bus tar of 
the pow= $&t, thw leaving it to each individual state to d e k m h e  
policy .in relation to ~ ~ n ,  distribution, and use, or the Author- 
ity might deliver shsm to the individual etab, lettving al l  electrid 
operation in national or private b d a  w dotarmined by the policies 
of the p d &  n a t i o ~  Problems of prica will be difkdt, but hem 
' 
again it &odd be m b l e  b stata basic policies- in the chrrrhr which 
will give rerrsollable mmmuw of faheas in tho 6xing of m t .  
The pmb1em of power pdnoing piles should be somewhat less 
diEdt in the case of hhe nandangezous p b b .  In t h e ,  kiombIe 
mntmiah will be d m t d  The h r t m  ahodd be able to provide 
for their docution of this type of plant in amordame with mare con- 
v e n t i d  mmmio strrndwb. It might be to provide that 
they &odd be located on the b h  of competitive bids among inter- 
errtad nations. On suoh a basis, countrim with ample power mwes 
in water, d, or oil would limit their bids to those warranted by the 
of attanative mums. Those countries having few or m v e  
odiumy sources of power might bid higher, but below the cost of 
other dtemativa. In this way fie maximum usefulnem of fusionable 
mate& with the great& conservation of o h  s o w m  of powor 
would be Bmued. 
Many other qne~tiom of the m 8  order &a those we have dkmsed 
can readily be imagined. These are mough to illusfrate the nature 
of the problem. 
' -  I 
x' 
The Tmns~fien for Internoiional Cunfrol 
1 
*= Whd fully in operation, p h  B M L d  in the preeus mtion 
b o d ,  in our opinion, p d e  atpaat rnewum of d t y  qpimt 
s u m  sb- by oterrtib w q w s .  Bu4 it will bke a camidmable 
- b b d o r e  h p h  oan be adopted, and onm the mtions of tbe world 
have sctopbd it; a still, h r h r  time dl be re4tri.d ta put the plen 
into opmtion, ' H is l-tisI to mmider what d be the oondition 
of && d- the hceawy.p&od of tmuitim. 
Y:, In parLieular we mmt kh nto, of the nature of the wmmitmeat 
d r d y  made for intenmtional eation in odex to detmnin~ w b h r  
the :propod aatsa the conditions attacked to that commitment. 
In the pronouncepents which the Unitad Statca has made and apon- 
sored in concert w i ~  other nahozia; the oommitment for action has 
srWay8 becn mudd with the reqriirmmt that the pmww of moving 
t a d  the god of complete inhmational ~11~bomtion mwt be 
acmrnphiod at stage by sppropriate s a f q p d a ,  1% h the pur- 
pmn of thia e d o n  to d&be fie extent to which the sugpkd plan 
d &tidy this mqUkmm6* 
Tba p&d of h d t i b n  m y  be broken down into two subperiods. 
h the k t  there d be no Afomio Dwdopmonf Authority. Them 
wiiI be diwmi~1~ in the A W o  Fasrgy Oommkion of the Unibd 
Nations Organisation, and ae a r d t  of these discudms, pmpokh 
fl be referred to tbe United Nations- Council and hembly and to 
t h e  a e v d  notions for further discussion and acceptance. From 
p m ,  thcro mill rasull a chaxtct that has been mti6ed by the 
variow nations. It is at t b  atage that the Atomia Development 
Authority will coma into being. All of this will inevitably requh 
time. In the second pcrbd, whm an Atomic Development Authority 
is cr&d by 'the ratification by the wvod nations of the ebartar 
whicb establishes f t, it hav* nn immense task M o r e  it, invohing 
many diflerent fields and many diflmnl nctivitim. It d d ,  of 
coarse, be ~ i b l o  t  hive the ordering and ~ u e n c e  of-these wtivi- 
tics, or rather sf under taking th*, to tbe dimtion of the Authority. 
Jt seems far more likely h t  p&vEom gov~rning the gequawe of 
- 
. - 4. 
steps by wbich'the Autbri* Wjn come inh full omtian  wiU be 
provided in the charter* 
Two Werant Hin& of coneid~tion wil l  be invdved in mtthg up 
the steps of dieoumion and operatiom On theme hand &-am, 
aa we 13hB1I see, ee~taia mdispemmble r e q h e n t e  for the a d o w  
a d  t&e 8 ~ 3 ~ b 8 8  qf fJIC hdf, which require that -in shpa be 
*en before others -'be &ective. On the other h d ,  them is 
a wide range of schedulm all equally mmpatible with the operability 
of the plan and a$dag p&audy its a w p W i &  to the several 
mtiona. We ahall be oonmed in this @ion with outlining the 
requirements of the plan as to whedule, md pointing-out whnt other 
d ~ m e ~ h 3  W8 not f i x d  the plm ihdf  md the e g  of W- 
quite new considemtiom am, wential. In 6 t h ~  wordrs; we shall 
attempt to dacribe those staps which mwt be.undeFtakea in s pur- 
ticdm order if the plan is t6 -me dmbiva st alL We &dl dm 
indicute othor s h p  which are a n- p d  of W i g  the plan 
into opemtion, but ae to whi& &are is some' bedom of ohoice in 
defermising their sequence. The seqt taca of the h t  wt of ~hpa 
bed by the plan iW; the seqnanw of the aemnd mt is a mlrtter 
tbat will have to be ftxed by the negotiation bet- hi X U L ~ ~ I W  
Tht  Position 4 the U. S. Dwing .the Tm~dti~n I 
In order to have mepnina, tha azmhabion of transition pariad 
must take amount of the pr-t pmiion of the United 8 k h  
in tho field of atomio energg, and that position must be cornpad 
with the one that this mune would occupy during the Mod when 
the plan for international wtion is being adopted and executed. 
to day'^ poltion must also ,be compared with the conditions that will 
prevail when the plan has finally been brought inta full operation. 
We must also mnsider what our position would be aqme yoars h e w  
if i ~ e  were forced to abandon our present commitment for in- 
t i o d  action and pmue inshad a purely national tratment of the 
problem. 
Today the U n i d  States haa a monopoIy in atomic weapone. Wa 
have atrategio stoclspila; we bave exbnsiv~ facilities for making the 
ingredients of atomic bombs imd for making the bornbe thwelvea; 
we have 8 large group of people skilled in the many arte wbich have 
gone into thie project; we have experience and know-how obtainable 
only in the actual practice of making stomio weapsm; we have 
mmidmbIe resourw~ of raw materid; and we ham 8 broad Wreb 
i d  howIedge of the Md which may appear hadequate in future 
yesrs, but whioh a b l e s  ue to evaluab not only the performance of 
the paat but a h  what tha future ia b l y  to hold 
& not be f-~t. 
q,m.the time which it 
- - r P o t t l d ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ d ; m ~ ~ t p o a i h , o r  
r eta& weapm. Above d, It i n d m  t4a rmbetit&ug+~$&~dq~ 
. 'rm~mte which m lmown to the war3d ~ Q P  dsveI-ta by!%sewr@ 
~nathm whieh might well r e m ~ . P Z O r a  Of k Emmt, 4 I#* 
, , v q f b b d m m y w o u l d  b e r s w n s t a a t s w ~ o e o f f e a ~ , ~  
and friction. 
Inherent in the adoption of any plan of h h a t h d  dontad h9 k 
probable amhation-bu8 only & t i 0 4  the rab ut which 
our pmd m p d y  will i n e d m  b p p w ,  einca mw how- 
n n d o u r m s & y d ~ s r t a , d t o a r m r p e ~ t o o r , g B y a i o s l  
. * b t d a t i o ~ ~ ~ ,  mwt d M y  be macia available to an 
'agency in the p m m  of at&Whg control. . I 
l1 Lofw~)&,k-&theplanwe-dmtG@. 
'If adoptad a d  m t e d  in g d  faith, thia wil I  have &d a mmm- 
'ably fall derg~ee of o m n  ins of At that tiaw -19 
,"dl the factcrm making the pmwmt pmitim of the United S W  in 
lrelstian to atomic eneqg n p m f d  one dl have been dimbtAA- 
The security which we hiee in the mdhtion of this pIlrn lies in the 
fact that it a m  the dtmjpr of h ~ u r p r h e  use of atomio wespne, 
. '-The aeiEuw by one nation of i ns ta l l ah  n v  for md&g Scomia 
weapons w d d  be' not d y  s dew dgmi of war& &at, bub it 
would learn other n s h  in s alone or in 
"to W e  c o u n ~ t i w s .  The p h ,  of c a m ,  haa other mtmity p w  
~ l ~ ~ b a t ~ t h e b ~ t ,  B o r i n t h e ~ h t  
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of cooperative effatt mong the natiam of the d d  mte k h  how we 
rightly hold for sol* the pmblem of war half. 
It ia d m  that it would be unwise to undertake a pkn based on the 
propmds which we have put forward d m  thm wem aome d i d  
hope that ther wdd be entered into and &ed through in good faith; 
riwertheie~~, wemu& provide again& the htwmd that thm may not 
be such gmd faith and mast aek: o d v m  thin quasbiom What will 
be the ~ t a h  of a i T h  should the p h  be adopted with the intention 
of evasion or abould w&on be undwkken by any nation during the 
years when it ia being put into efXeut? 
The b& of our present monopoly now h a  in two rather Wmnt 
thinga: howIedge, aad phy8id fwilitits. The u€tim&ta gmgrapW 
brrlanoe toward which rr plsn for.inkmatiOasl control muat work will 
witnmw the 1- of both kinds of monopoI y. Knowledge will become 
general, and f d i t i e a  wil l  neither in their legal pmsdon nor in their 
geogmphicd dietribution &wily favor any one nation. Although 
both elemmte of our pment hegemony will thus diaappar over a 
p h o d  of yema, quite ditTmmt ddemt iom ape Wolved In the 
abaring of our bodedge and in the balaxlatog of phyaid f d h  
The Mot~ ia l  Acpwetr of the Twmdffgn 
Tfse h m f w  of such f d t i e a  to inbrndbad oontwl; the &tab- 
lbhmmt under inteFnational ~ t m l  of similar W t i m  in . o h  
d o n s ;  the meation of stockpilea; the gradual Mdbg up of group 
of men &itlad in the various mmwuy &a-&ae are dungas which 
from their very nature will requim tims to bring about, and which 
can, within not tuo wide limits, be d~ed,dod and conhllod. In, the 
diecwiona within the Unitd Nationa CommSon 1a4titq up to the 
adoption of the chwtw for the Authority, and even more in the d y  
p h m g  p b  of the Authority's work, them will h v e  to be Borne 
&domm by ue of themetid infoxpu~tiw. But these ~ ~ l l s  
end them plans wi l l  not eamthlly dtm the presant supmhrity of the 
Unitd States. They will not move ita stockpies of mum or of 
fissiomble material or ita bomba or its operating plants, a d  need not 
alter tho operation of #BBB plants. Them disclosures of information, 
now secret, will not create in my other nation the .-erience and the 
know-how which are so gnat a part of our pr-t position of 
superiority. 
No matter what may be the Bchedule of operations adoptmd, this 
mtuation cannot dmga overnight under trny c k u m s w .  Never- 
thelm, it f clear that v e q  e o u s  consideration must be givm to the 
schduliag of t h m  p w c d  and legal & m p s  which over a period of 
yeam wil l  bring about a b&md inkwnational opmtion. On &e I 
one hand, the general prindpl~ underlying thie scheduling will hum -' 
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Tae bdeiation of +? asp. of tmdtion Iiy 3hib W.%'PM: 
Pgti6'ab;l IJM ~bbi ** be relipquirhed-y*b~ q ~ &  9 ~ .  
dues .  The siquenco, the o r d w ,  4 the timing d &ehL@ 
m y  be decSv,e for ths accepbbility of the in tmstiolul ooptroh; 
a-6 not d e c t  its opddity .  Tbedoe, they prwan't phbtbhq 
of neetiation betwoen"the mtioni ~ t h h i  fhe UNO in the dn~' 
agreagreihq$ upon a dwkw for the Atomic Development A U & & ~ , " ~  
Sucli pm~Iame of negotiation, in our opinion, are eepm~ble from th 
naim of &a objective of the ncgoth'tion. 'They we pmblm wh£& 
-t be ~ 0 1 ~ 4 d   POW^ ~ B C U B O  tbw depad, -OW thhg~~, on' 
the motintion of the ph&ipaw nations, on tbe politid ba+ 
&ynd of tho nagotiatima, and on what may be wlieeikd to be fabir .' 
aopamte, as opposed to the collective, inkre& of ih& rsntians. - " ! 
!Fhg eitcnt to which 8pecial precautions need to ba takm to pm&d ' 
pment'~mcrican advan- must be importantly M u a d  by' the ' 
charmh i  of the negotiation and by the earnestnw wvah is d- 
fated bg: the s e v d  natiam in an attempt to solve the common ~ b ; "  
l& of in@mtionraI control. Thae quastioira lie in the domah of- 
highat natiohd policy h' in-tiod mhtions. 
We am' opnvinced &at the fnst major activitim of the Authorits 
mpt  be dimhd to obtuining cqnhnm and control ovar the raw' 
rn+WSa kituation. Thia conk01 may of wupae be subject to-M&' 
gom, defined in the c h b ,  on the M o m  of the AuEhori@ in Stg' 
d y  operations to alter the nittiod &hibution of mw ' 
., ..  b l . .  , LA:' 
~ c h i s b o t h a ~ m d a a ~ t i 4 p m & .  11wilIhhgiti.es 
t o b ~ ~ ~ e ~ f o r m ~ a b ~ i ~ o b ~ ~ ~ d  for 
their ~rdinajon with private aud mtiod ona. !&M undthk- 
ings are fundammhl for the opmtion of the ~uEhodt$ and to 'all of 
ita futrm p p e o f  ef BU- 
There sre othsr things whiah no doubt & ~ u t h o r i t ~  would wish to 
do at once, Without much delay it sboald mt up Isbomtoriee for the 
~tudy of nuclear p h y k  and the technoIogM p m h  thst it mmt 
expect k~ encountar in ib future work. It should a t h p  t to eekbhh 
suibble f o m  of WII 4 inhmhange with private and naw 
btitutione working on atomic energg or on ite applications' or on the 
fundamental ~ieneea which may: be involved. In short, the Authority 
should get BW on its meumh p- and in estabhbing the 
pat- ofits lidaon with other agencies for whkh it wil l  be mponsibla 
in the future. 
It would be d&ble that evan in the mJie~t d a p  the Authoriiy 
net to pemnit the uef! of radioactive tram materials and tho88 hbora- 
tory motora which we smdl amounts of denetumd active m a W ,  
and which seem to provide auch valuable hob for maem& in a vtrrie@ 
of fields. 
Tho Authority may need t~ estnbhh, even in its wlimt days, 
plsnning boa& to make ~tudiea of the diflicult quatiom of stock- 
p h g ,  power devdopmant, future plant construction; it may nesd to 
eet up n ayetern for the recording and accounting of opmtionn 
in the field of raw materials, and in the production p h t s  of the 
Unitad States. 
These seem to us raasonable plans for initial operationa. All the 
othw operations of the Authority are d i n l y  mbject to acheddhg. 
They may mxornpw them initid operatiow, or they may come 
law. But tbe oontrol of raw m s ~ ~  is an -tial prerequisite br 
all fwhher progrm and it ia the h t  job that the Authority mwt 
undertake. It will be a continuing activiw* but what we are con- 
w e d  with ia that it should start. 
In coneiderin@; the s p e d  p i t i o n  of the TTnitgd Stab ,  there- we, 
as we hsva seen, tho foUowhg imporhmt componente, the h n -  
tinuance or t r a d e r  of which ta the jurisdiction of the Authority will 
have to be very carefully deduled by iahrmtiod negotiation: our 
raw material supplies; the plants at Oak Ridg.8 and Henford w w  
operating to make atomio q I d v e a ;  the ~tockpIea of bomb now in 
our p d o n ;  the stookpih~ of undenatured Uomble matmkh; 
our atomic bomb plmt and laboratmy at Lon h a .  Our Ioaa of 
monopoly ia them elemexrb cannot be ind&tely wtponed. Some 
of tbe things we now b y e  wi l l  have to m e ;  mme wi l l  have tO be 
bnderred to the Authority; mme wil l  have to be p a d d e d  by 
mtivitiea dmvhae.  
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- ~ ~ e : ~ ~ ~ f h e ~ ~ w i t h ~ a ' ~ a l  i k w m % & & ~ ~ m * w ~ ~  
~ . i % ~ i w ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ r ~ ~ a f ~ ~  
@ W ~ ~ ; i k d ~ & & a r d a n g e S ~ ~ g i v e u a  
-,+if wa W ' m  W W t i w ,  Bo wpm for trtomift 
&- The*aaa~h~&gntf;imarathlring*e~n 
rt 1-t mo& faitddi*~- w cr htd within tho 
7h%d~F%ka. T h  thld:Wh%a% -$in &e p h  at my 
hime d r r r i n g t & ; e ~ ; w d d d l b j l ~ a h ~ ~ o n d &  
regaidtotlfomicweapana. * . -  . , I, , . 
R = l  
~ p c h p k  of h&mofion 01 im bf hi& 
onadtaeel~tarint6epraspmt~b.~tbs~lpi~$t.tes 
*kaov3edgg. , T b i . r a ~ g e s ~ ~ h e w . y W m ~ ~ ~ ~ k e r s  
r t?m, inbhate practical details of .$pow-W.:, l ~ ~ i ~ , I ~ -  
. n i z ~  tasc tas transmiapion of my p'k, or a, of &lwR1l&q, to 
an+= 09ula -provide for an *.fl!rlIghd 
I dart to make atomic weapons. Even that psrt sfq* ibq&dp 
WW jB tlqmti*, wwch CBH be tmumjt'kd b @.,of .qgth,~b$ 
f b a t l r ,  or by WriLfen nob is ofA value in tb COD* ,,I$, pa19 
b k l d g e  wwe a d b l e  tt r i d  underhkbg it would &r$q& 
$& seed& for the solum of the prw ti& problems of ntlrkitrp .wt 
wtapom, b;y aliminn- qertaip u t m m u  srltEmativea# by.* 
moq ddhibly 4- fmtum WIG& depead an tb 
b w l e d g e ,  snd by mpkinoLit possible to U D . ~ & ~ W  tb varimi 
oftJ~pmgmmmomqIyigpwldl4 dxqrfhsainmquen~~. :$t is 
&t, .in wy ppinion, p d &  to give a &bIa e~timab of how my* 
d m ~ h t b g  W O @ ~  @.* w e   OX a a u d  id 
f!gort. It is yncElim€tle th&k 23 imdd aqt ho .&nqwtJy @ q h w $ *  
It, is+ oqnpi~ubb that it might be sh- by. a , y w  w EO. Tor m 
evalu~tbnoa fbh, point depends on hfmtion, which isnot avqihbk 
to us, on the +tailed plans and polish of such s rid undmhhg, aq 
aa on,th@ir pmwqt atat& of ImswJeago. It in, of,cu~, d w  that 
evm with all uu& theomhid ~~ svailabla, a major p g p n ~ ,  
. ~ - ~ ~ y k , L ~ L B d f O r t h e a c : f u d p w d u c t i o n o f  
e- weapone. 
Our m-poly oqlmowm mrvlot be, d &uld not bp, lost rt 
&a. H, again &me ru?e &Q&&~OIIS an the EiGhmhling idmmt 
i a t h e m b d o u r w , m d i n h n a t u r s o f - a d q -  
far Wi mwpbge .  But even with the, " of 
=imitetiOBs, ,- is a n*er fieadom of *bW+ 
~~ of .discbeurers. Hw oqoaidw@na of aqqm & 
os~PQ%ww%wwd*~!K-w-tiM- -.., 
. . I ~ . ~ + - W ~ ~ W , W W * ~ W @ ~ M  
be d i d d  mom or h mugw hint0 cstegories. T ~ B  amp- 
o p e r a t i o n o f ~ p l e n w i l l m q ~ d i ~ ~ ~ ~ € d 3 o f ~  
information, at a u d v e  thm. A sebedule cum outline the point 
kt WE& muat wmr. In particular, there there a Wtd @am 
of information which should be didgad is, the wly meetingalof &e 
Unitad Nstiaw Commission dkuwhg thaw p b l ~ m ~ .  Them M a 
more e x W v e  category which mu& be bewed some years herxwe 
afkw a charter hm been adopted d the Atomic Devdopmmt Au- 
thority is raady to e& its operatha; snd there am 0th ah- 
gorh that may be w a d  until the Authority la& uudddc~s  
=me of the subsequent shges of ita operations, for instarm, thmq 
that involve reaerrrch on weapons. We are convinced that under 
the plan proposed in tb roport wch echedulii is possible, though 
it is clam, as we hsve pointed, out, that many factoh beyond the 
mpa of this report, and invobing the highmt aonaidamti~ns of 
international policy, will be involved in such deduleg. We wi& to 
emphasize that it will involve an initial di- of information, 
which is j11sti6able in view of the importmce of edy progressl on tIw 
path of internatiod coopenrtion. 
It i8 h e ,  iW fh8 of &tafe h mid, that there b nothing 
in the Resolution setting up the Atomio E m  =-on that 
m p e h  the UniM States to produce infomation for the use of the 
United Nations hnmiwion. But the point h t  & to be em- 
p h a d d  ia that unless we sare proparod to provide the infomthn 
m t i d  to an &&anding of the problem, the Co- i h l f  
cannot even be& the task that has bem -ed to it, 
h t  us o x b e  in a little more detail the nnture of the infomtiw 
which is requid in the early a*. What ie important for the 
disrruesiana in the Wtd Nations Oqgmhation Oommkioa ki that 
the M m b m  an8 their tahical adpiaem have an damtanding of 
the problem of the inkmationel control of atomic en- and of the 
damenb of the propomla thnt the Unitad Shtoe membw wil l  pub 
f o d .  They mast be in a position to undmhd what tha pmspecte 
for mnstructiva applicatiom of atomic energ am and to appreciate 
the nature of the d q u d s  which the p h  we here prom & o h .  
They must be in a poition to evaluabs dternrrtivss which may arise, 
and to have insight into the rather complex intmmhtions of the 
various activitiae in thia field. A b ~ e  a33 they must have a sound 
enough ovorall knowledge of the field M a whole to mgnize  that no 
relevant OF -cant mnmnttere have been withheld. For the pmcm 
of reaching common qpeemexlt on mawurea of inkmabid control 
prempposes an adequats wmmunity of knowIedga of fact. Much 
of the infomt50n wEoh is required for this purpose L aIready widdy 
laown. We ara mnvinmd, howevd, h t  there sre further itezrur now 
held by m ae ~ecret without which the micamy insight will be - - 
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rn&b obbih. mMitbim.6 of- *vhmtiaal~ d ~~. 
R a & r O ~ s h a W k ~ ~  w.dB w$'&€i a e ~ ~ - t l p p ~  
o f ' ~ ' e ~ ~ : ~ X n  6mrb@doh;€heyeae Idy-cplaxibtive; d 
ttreyinrtdvawby&-b. - 
w Qn W ~ ) W W , . ~ ' h ~ ~ A ~ ~ D c t r e @ m n t  AutBoPi~Lin 
& W, it mwt b v d  made 
~tiai~fieltl+pw0tid Wi w d  
m-&w~Wd: Thb, Pithe bu-,&#s.&igbwor t 
r a k p t e  ta o b w m M v d  ri*r ~~~~~~~ 
a mdhb1~fo i k M k n d d & b c W i & h ~ p m b h . '  Tbia 
mpi'on obug&& a pwhpaw lwimk* 
it by n # & m d n b % . ~  ' &at- 
- and dev&pmerit in the field. <of '~tm%&w%qWW& will 'b 
undcctaken by the Authoxity only at'a kte 
l0gic-d infomation f&hihg td mob d i e . 4 ~  
b. 4- it m tbe esr i ierhpk.  I t  i a ~ t o ~ ~ ~ ~  
h t  Mom tlm A d o d b  m undertake &me 6f iizi:-~& as- 
the cm&iwtEon of reactom or the d d p m e m t  bf *, i%dltW, 
3 t o ~ a o m o - t i m e i n p ~ f h e a e m t i v i t i ~ a n d i a ~ ' ~ ~  toward &a,' d that infomation mwt be a d e  adilk&..-? 
- m o u @ t o m a k e s U c h ~ d r a a c a m b s 8 m t m e .  Id ' I  I 
T h k  me of ~uirementa for information by tha A- 
~e~db~rnmt Authority at wrbaia atagea d ita pmgr& &i ae;ir 
mpting the plan hme rocommmded for h a t i d  aontd,: b b :  
United 8taM wil l  be oommitkd to making avAb11 thb infonudh 
at the time, and in the full measure requid  by the opemting h 
sitim. Omx the mqumca md timing of etagea has been W by> 
. negotiation ahd agreaneht between the nations, a m&nm mta td 
didosure of information wil l  heve beem fixed by the agrmnemt as w& 
A too ~euutious release of infoxplatim to tbe A W a  Ddoprnmk- - 
Autho~ty might m fact liave tbe effect of prevmting i B  from &+IF 
coming to life. For one of &e d&ve responsibilities of the Auhriw 
is the e s t a b ~ e n t  and mainhanca of the d w  of the wdd '  
agaht atomic d a r e .  It mast be eacoursged to ex& fibat 
mnsib i l i ty ,  and to obtain for itself the t e ch id  mmkq that ie 
EIMential; 
We may furthm darify the nature of the &dosum r e q u i d  by 
thia W'B pposals by a refwemce to a report. We have had tW 
. opportunie -ta examine in d e w  s mport of Dmmuk, 1946, phw 
p ~ e d  for the ManItsm Dhtriot by ite Committee on D-
tion, ID d t t e e '  of seven h t i sC ,  hduding the &s W eE( 
dl the major laboratmiee of the Project.' T h  C h d & &  
- 1 Yamberan$ of thin IJo-e Inhded R. F. B e ,  d, H. Comlpbon, & 0. 
- . . L a w r s n o e , J . R ~ , F . C t . ~ g , H . a V r e y , m d E O . T o l n r a a ,  
4 .. Cbalrman. 
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*fta report ~ n . 8 , ~ :  of cl#kah*that L d w x v  
d w i a t j t i 6 o d  ~ m a t e r i a l e o w . ~  as Seqet,apEcg 
~ ~ ~ b & p ~ i h ~ ~ , d ~ ~ . ~  
a m .  In ipteEp* i@ &motive the committee limited it& 
to a conaid~~l~iionoltbeeeobjdv~~ hthubmm sfatq~wubmqf 
wnW2: It ~ ~ 0 0 m ~ e n 8 e d  agaht &&dicution at the 
pmmt time of a very d d & I e  body bodg. ofd, tdnologi4 .  
indushid, and ordnance infomation, that ie bformatim baring 
directly OD &e manufacture of weapons md the dmign rtnd opaatim 
of production plants. But it ret~,mmwded the prompt d w  
tion of a large body of acientao h t  axld of tadmid Mqmation of 
nmdticd aatura and wide appIiMty.. It q p m d  the view 
that the further d ~ c & t i m  of oritid ibma of bmiO t h m t i d .  
b I & e  would conduos, not only to eke natbd welfare, but to 
the long-term n a t i d  d b  m wan--M &ubt bmaw d the 
damaging &wt which o a n t b d  m e q - i n  these mattere could hap 
on wr own seient& a d  t&nial p m ,  Cmponding to k e  
distinctiom, the Committee divided our s-t acid& asd Mcd 
information into three catqpries, the b t  of which it reoonunpmded 
for kcnmediab dedamifmtion; the a d  d which it remwuended 
for eventual d b i k a t i o n  in the intermts of long-term, natiohal 
d t y  of the United SbW; md for the W of which it recan- 
mended &rut dechScation in the abence of effective interma- 
tied mntrol. We have tried to see. what a c a l  informatian this 
board wodd find esential for the sort of undm- that mwt be 
esbblbhed 8 b& for dis~Ud0Jl the m O  COII~I&&OXI, a d  to 
compare thia with the iterms listed in the report of the C0mmitt-s~ on 
Decldifimtion. Mmy of the facb needed are dmdy public; maajr 
are included in C h  Ode; the reminder are all in Clam Two, and 
mmprisa perhepe one-third of the ifems there listed, It is important 
a& to emphasize that the Daclrresifiatiou Commith'a mmmmenda- 
tion was aimed at furthering our own lonpbsm national d i y  in 
the absence of int#n&ional m€WUfee, 
Wa wi& to mphab that the initial dimdoeurea wi l l  p h  iq the 
hand of a -tion (should it be acting in bad faith) infamation .which 
could lead to m aderation of an atomic mmment We do 
not regard this circumattu1w as in any way pwdiar to the plan recorn- 
mended in tbis report. It is inherent in the mncopt of i n ~ t i o d  
controI. The adoption of my workable wham of inhmatioasl wn- 
&oi may ehortm the time during whioh the United States bas a posi- 
tion aa favorable aa it hae today. We cunnot be sure of W, but we 
mnat be prepwed for it. 
. . 
winaati31thesbeina 
wapom. This avombie p d & W  Wnge; 
h a n d l e m d i t m t u p o n h p  
when** inoperation the plan 
m W 0 f  d t y  agahlst surprise at^. 
that. It C M  deterrwts to the ~~ o_f'-b&gm@,i$ &@rat- 
raion, a d  it wan u b b l i i  pathma of wuw&w@2m, the 
atemiop of which may wen contribub to the ss1&m & b& 
ofwariW* WhenthapIanisinfulloperatimthme+dl~hgerh 
m t s  aboat tttomic emagy. We hhvt3 tbt fidm~~&baais 
of d t y ;  for in the long term t b m  cm be no iatmm4iW &1 
andl no inhmstiod coopmation wK& does not pmuppoee an ho- 
mtionaI mlhmunity of H n o w ~ .  
C m w m u I , B ~ m  . 
J. a, OPP- .. 
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